Notre Dame Law School

NDLScholarship
Journal Articles

Publications

2020

Forgotten Borrowers: Protecting Private Student Loan Borrowers
through State Law
Judith Fox
Notre Dame Law School, judith.l.fox.30@nd.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Judith Fox, Forgotten Borrowers: Protecting Private Student Loan Borrowers through State Law, 11 U.C.
Irvine L. Rev. 43 (2020).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/1448

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please
contact lawdr@nd.edu.

Forgotten Borrowers: Protecting Private
Student Loan Borrowers Through
State Law
Prentiss Cox,* Judith Fox,** & Stacey Tutt***

Private student loan borrowers arguab!J have the fewest protections of any users of credit
in the United States. In a scarce!J debated amendment to federal bankruptry law in 2005,
private student lenders gained the same protections against discharge previous!J afforded to
federal student lenders. Yet private student loan borrowers received none of the rights available
to federal student loan borrowers. These include income-driven repayment, relief from
repayment on disability, loan discharge for fraud or closed schools, and public service loan
forgiveness. Private student loan borrowers thus have neither the bankruptry protections
afforded to nonstudent loan debtors nor the repayment and debt relief rights of student
borrowers under the federal loan program.
This lack of consumer protection has particular consequence when considering the plight
offor-profit school students saddled with private student loans. Some of the worst abuses in
the proliferation of higher education debt have been perpetrated against for-profit school
attendees. The vast majority of private student loans are cosigned, typical!J by older fami!J
members. This combination ofprivate student loans and for-profit school attendance impacts
a much broader range of consumers than would a comparable number offederal student loans.
We suggest two types of state legislation to protect these debtors. For prospective
for-profit school private borrowers, we propose incorporating some of the protections offederal
student loans through the use of a state equivalent to the Federal Trade Commission ''Holder
Rule." For all private student loans, we propose a requirement that private lenders engage in
a mandatory settlement process, similar to those used by states during the recent foreclosure
crisis, as a prerequisite to using state courts for debt collection.
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the UC Irvine School of Law "Student Loan Law" symposium and from Matthew Bruckner, Yan Cao,
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INTRODUCTION

Private student loan borrowers have the weakest consumer financial
protections of any group of borrowers. They generally have no right to discharge
their private student loans in bankruptcy, yet they have none of the repayment
options and debt relief rights that accompany federal student loans. Unlike many
other types of consumer lending substantially left to state law, such as payday loans
or motor vehicle loans, state law protections for private student loan borrowers are
nonexistent in most states.
This lack of protection has particular meaning for higher education students
attending for-profit schools. The fraudulent marketing and abusive lending
practices in for-profit higher education is well documented. Also well-established is
the history of state and federal regulators failing to control these abuses or, in many
instances, actually abetting the proliferation of these schools. When these unfair and
deceptive practices result in former students burdened with private student loans
that lack basic protections, the result is a group of debtors who have been forgotten
under consumer protection law.
In this Article, we argue for two types of legislation that can be enacted by
states to protect these borrowers. First, we propose the Private Student Borrower
Protection Act, which would require a private student loan contract for attending a
for-profit school to incoiporate a specific set of rights afforded to federal student
loan borrowers. We use the concept underlying the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) ''Holder Rule" to accomplish this goal. This state legislation would apply to
future private student loan borrowers attending for-profit schools.
Second, we propose the Private Student Loan Mediation Act, which would
require mediation before any judgment is entered for nonpayment of any private
student loan. We use the successful mortgage mediation state laws instituted in the
aftermath of the financial crisis as a model for this legislation. The proposed
legislation would require private lenders to engage in good faith mediation, which
the legislation would presume exists if the lender affords the private student loan
borrower repayment and debt relief rights that are analogous to those provided in
the federal student loan program.
In Part I of this Article, we describe the daunting problem facing former
for-profit school students indebted on private student loans. The number of private
loans dropped during the Great Recession but are again on the rise. Students who
attend for-profit schools find themselves with high levels of student loan debt and,
more often than not, cannot qualify for the employment their school promised.
Private student loans do not provide borrowers with the same protections that
accompany federal student loans but face the same restrictions on bankruptcy.
Congress left little legislative footprint in 2005 when it brought the massive volume
of private student loans under the exemption from bankruptcy that had long applied
to federal student loans.
In Parts II and III of this Article, we set forth the structure and rationale for
the two legislative proposals. We describe the existing regulatory frameworks that
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we use for creating consumer protection-the FTC Holder Rule and state mortgage
mediation laws. We then describe the scope of the laws and the specific protections
that are afforded to covered borrowers. Finally, a model state law is included in an
appendix for each of the legislative proposals.
I. AB USES AND MISSING LEGAL PROTECTIONS IN PRIVATE LENDING TO
FOR-PROFIT SCHOOL STUDENTS

Private student loans make up a small portion of the entire student loan pie,
but it is a trillion-dollar pie. 1 Even a small portion of such an industry can have an
impact on borrowers and their communities. To understand this sector of the
industry, it is first necessary to examine how it developed and grew to be such a
force in student borrowing.
A. Rise and Fall and (Partial) Resurrection of Private Student Loans

The federal government first waded into the funding of college educations
after World War II. The Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1944 provided money
for soldiers returning from World War II to get an education. 2 The Higher
Education Act of 1965 was the first to provide broad, needs-based financial aid in
the form of grants, loans, and work-study programs. 3 In 1972, the Pell grant
program was created to provide more grants, as opposed to loans, for students. As
a result, from 1970 to 1979, grants surpassed student borrowing. 4 In the 1980s, the
Reagan administration took several steps to shift the burden of funding higher
education from the government to the student. 5
Most students obtain a federal subsidized loan better known as the Stafford
loan. The size of the Stafford loan is regulated by the federal government. 6 Students
complete an application and the Department of Education calculates the "Expected
Family Contribution." This is the amount the student and her parents are required
to pay. This information is then sent to the school, which calculates the cost of

1. ELAN AMIR,JARED TESLOW & CHRISTOPHER BORDERS, MEASUREONE, THE MEASURE
ONE PRIVATE STUDENT LOAN REPORT (2019),https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/6171800/assets/
downloads /Measure One %20Private%20Student%20Loan %20Report%20Q3%202019. pdf [https :/ /
perma.cc/5VYJ-PZ2J].
2. Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.).
3. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (codified as amended at 20
u.s.c. § 1070).
4. Linda E. Coco, Mortgaging Human Potential: Student Indebtedness and the Practices of the
Neo!ibera! State, Sw. L. REV. 565, 584 (2013).
5. Id. at 585-86.
6. The banking industry has been lobbying recently to decrease the size of the graduate school
and parent plus loans, which would invariably push more people into the private student loan market.
\Vhile unsuccessful so far, these efforts have the support of Betsy Devos's Department of Education.
Christopher K. Odinet, The New Data of Student Debt, 92 S. CAL. L. REv. 1617, 1624 (2019).
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attendance. The federal subsidized loans and grants are set based on those costs.7
The good news for students is that these federal loans do not require a credit check.
Most students have no credit history and would not qualify for an unsecured loan
of the size necessary to attend college. The problem, however, is that if the family
cannot meet the Expected Family Contribution, the student and her parents are
forced to try other options. Private student loans are one such option.
Private entities have been involved in the student loan market since at least
the 1960s. From 1965 until 2010, federal student loans were originated by private
lenders, but backed by the federal government. Private lenders also offered student
loans without federal guarantees, often as a companion to the federally guaranteed
loan. 8 This all changed in 2010 with the Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act,
which eliminated the private lender intermediary for federal loans. 9 From 2010
forward, federal student loans were made directly by the government to the student,
resulting in a clear distinction between federal student loans made by the
government with no private lender intermediary and a fully private student loan
with no government guarantee or involvement, which is the subject of this Article.
The private student loan market exploded and fell in tandem with the
subprime mortgage market in the 2000s. It grew from less than $5 billion in 2001
to over $20 billion in 2008, accounting for a quarter of all student loans that year. 10
The 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(BAPCPA) 11 afforded private student lenders protection against student-declared
bankruptcy, something already enjoyed by federally guaranteed student lenders.
There are two arguments for allowing this special protection in bankruptcy. The
first is to bring down the cost of credit, or the so-called bankruptcy tax. 12 The
second is to decrease the risk to lenders, thereby incentivizing them to increase the
available credit. A study of private student loans before and after BAPCPA
confirmed the latter, but not the former. 13 The number of loans increased
significantly during the period immediately following BAPCPA, and the credit
profile of the borrowers decreased slightly. 14 However, the cost of the loans actually

7. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS: REPORT TO THE SENATE
COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON
FINANCIAL SERVICES, AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND
THE WORKFORCE 10 (2012) [hereinafter PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS], https:/ /files.consumer
finance.gov/ f/ 201207_cfj:,b_Reports_Private-Student-Loans.pdf [https:/ / perma.cc/ 6MHK-PX8N].
8. Id. at 9-13 (tracing history of private student loans).
9. Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 1254 Stat. 107.
10. PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS, supra note 7, at 17.
11. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23.
12. Xiaoling Ang & Da1ie Jimenez, Private Student Loans and Bankruptcy: Did Four-Year
Undergraduates Benefit from Increased Co!!ectabi!ity of Student Loans?, UpJohn Press (forthcoming)
(manuscript
at
175-76),
https:/ /papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2332284
[https:/ /perma.cc/74LB-FZVW] (Mar. 12, 2018).
13. Id. at 206.
14. Id. at 213.
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increased. 15 As we saw in the subprime mortgage crisis, the amount of credit
increased, but it increased at a significant cost to the borrowers.
The Great Recession that followed had an immediate effect on this market,
and both the size and number of private loans plummeted. In the 2010---2011
academic year, they accounted for only seven percent of the market. 16 Although
modest, they are experiencing somewhat of a comeback. As of June 30, 2019,
private student loans comprised 7.76% of the market. 17 While this may seem to be
a very small share of a market-too small, perhaps, to raise concern-it is important
to remember the massive size of that market, for which 7.76% represents more than
$124 billion dollars in loans. 18
Private student loans require credit checks, and as a result, the majority of
private student loans have cosigners, usually parents. 19 Parents can also apply for
federal Parent Plus loans. These loans, though subsidized, do not offer some of the
repayment protections offered by the loans made directly to students. 2 Federally
subsidized loans have fixed interest rates, though those rates can change. 21 Federal
graduate loans also have a fixed rate, though more expensive than undergraduate
loans. 22 Private loans have variable rates set based on the credit factors of a
borrower. 23 While all students who take out a Stafford loan at the same time will
pay the same interest rate, if those same students take out a private loan, the interest
rates can vary dramatically. An investigation by the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) showed that most private student loans are more expensive than
the corresponding Stafford loan. 24 In addition, while the federal government covers
the interest on federal loans while a student remains in school, the interest on private
loans can begin to accrue the day the loan is made.
Some for-profit schools became very creative in the way in which they
financed student attendance. They attempt to bypass the federal student loan
market altogether. This seriously disadvantages their students because the loans are
more expensive and come without any of the repayment advantages of federal loans.

°

15. Id.
16. U.S.
Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF.,
GAO-19-430,
PRIVATE
STUDENT
LOANS: CLARIFICATION FROM CFPB COULD HELP ENSURE MORE CONSISTENT OPPORTUNITIES
AND TREATMENT FOR BORROWERS 5 (2019) [hereinafter GAO-19-430], https://www.gao.gov/
assets/700/699338.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/MFA5-G2PP].
17. AMIRET AL., supra note 1.
18. Id.
19. The number of private loans with co-signers has increased significantly post-recession.
During the 2019-2020 academic year, ninety-two percent of private undergraduate loans originated
required co-signers. AMIR ET AL., supra note 1, at 39.
20. See infra Section LC.
21. The Perkins loan is the one type of federal loan with a statutorily fixed interest rate (five
percent). However, no new Perkins loans have been made since 2017 when the program expired.
Odinet, supra note 6, at 1629.
22. Id. at 1630.
23. PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS, supra note 7, at 12.
24. Id. at 14.
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The Minnesota School of Business and Globe University were two such institutions
operating in Minnesota. 25 The schools offered their students loans of up to $7,500
at interest rates between twelve and eighteen percent, 26 rates substantially higher
than those available through the Stafford program. The students never actually
received the funds. Instead, the money was applied to their tuition bill. 27 The state
of Minnesota sued the schools alleging they were not licensed in the state to make
these loans and that the loans were usurious under state law. 28 The schools claimed
the loans were a hybrid product, not a revolving loan subject to the interest rate cap,
but also not closed-end credit. 29 As the Minnesota Supreme Court explained, the
loans were structured in a way that gave the schools "the benefit of open-end credit
plans-charging interest in excess of eight percent-without providing the students
the benefits of revolving credit."30 The court determined the loans were usurious
in violation of Minnesota law.3 1
Innovative loan products can sometimes be beneficial, but as we learned in
the subprime mortgage crisis, they are just as often used to disadvantage the
unwary. 32 We need to be more diligent when new products appear. One such
product has recently entered the market, the income-sharing agreement. Purdue
University, a public Indiana college, is the best-known university that has adopted
this model, though it has been a favorite of abusive commercial driving schools for
decades. 33 The Purdue model is available to students in lieu of Parent Plus or private
student loans. Like the schools in Minnesota, they claim it is not a loan. 34 The school
does not charge interest, although Purdue is careful to point out that you will pay
back more than you received. 35 That sounds like interest. When you graduate, you
agree to repay the school a percentage of your income for ten years. 36 The terms of
the loan depend on certain underwriting factors but not those traditionally used in
lending. Instead, the institution uses what it terms "education factors," things like

25. State v. Minn. Sch. of Bus., 899 N.W.2d 467, 468 (Minn. 2017).
26. Id. at 469.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 469-70.
29. Id. at 475.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, PHISHING FOR PHOOLS: THE
ECONOMICS OF MANIPULATION & DECEPTION (2015) (explaining how if a profit can be made, then
people will look for people to deceive).
33. Income Share Agreements, PURDUE U., https:/ /www.purdue.edu/dfa/types-of-aid/incomeshare-agreement/index.html [https:/ /perma.cc/GL8M-HRKW] (last visited Sept. 27, 2020); see also
Robert Farrington, Be Careful with Income Sharing Agreements (ISAs) to Pay for College, FORBES
(Apr. 12, 2019, 7:48 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertfarrington/2019/04/12/incomesharing-agreements-to-pay-for-college/ #4aa 7a 7ea52e0 [https:/ / perma.cc/ 4QLX-DCAW] (explaining
why they may be more expensive than student loans).
34. Back a Boiler Program Overview, PURDUE U., https:/ /www.purdue.edu/backaboiler/
overview/index.html [https:/ /perma.cc/2B4H-QLD3] (last visited Sept. 27, 2020).
35. Id.
36. Id.
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your major, GPA, or SAT score.37 The school provides an online tool for you to
compare your loan terms based on your major. 38 Most students who enroll in
Purdue will graduate, 39 so perhaps for students attending this kind of institution,
this is a funding option to consider. However, for-profit schools have abysmal
graduation rates and even worse job placements. If this kind of lending spreads to
that industry, there will be substantial negative consequences for students.

B. Abuses in Private Student Loans to For-Profit School Students
Private student loans should be a last resort, something a student enters into
only when unable to fund his education through grants and federal loans.
Unfortunately, this is not the reality. Some students never exhaust their federal loan
limits, but instead go directly into more expensive private loans that do not offer
the repayment options available through federal loans. 40 While we can speculate as
to why this occurs, one fact is suggestive. The CFPB determined that in 2008,
forty-two percent of undergraduate students who attended a for-profit school took
out a private loan, while only fourteen percent of all undergraduates had a private
student loan. 41 At every stage of the growth and collapse of the private student loan
market, for-profit students have originated private loans at a higher percentage than
other types of students. At the height of the private student loan boom in 2008,
for-profit students were more than three times as likely to have a private student
loan than other types of students (11.1 % to 39.7%). 42 By 2016, in the aftermath of
the collapse of the private student loan market, for-profit students were still over a
third more likely than other students to obtain private student loans
(7.2% v. 5.3%). 43 This relationship between private student loans and for-profit
schools is significant and is the main problem this Article hopes to address.
For-profit schools have used a number of deceptive practices to attract
students, many of which involve deceptive student loans. Attorneys general from
across the country have brought numerous actions to investigate everything from
false advertising to falsifying student signatures on loan applications. 44

37. Odinet, supra note 6, at 1619-20.
38. Comparison Tool,
PURDUE U., https:/ /www.purdue.edu/backaboiler/comparison/
index.html [https:/ /perma.cc/ZJA2-MCMZ] (last visited Sept. 27, 2020).
39. Purdue Graduation Rate & Retention Rates,
COLL. FACTUAL,
https:/ /www.college
factual.com/ colleges/ purdue-university-main-campus /academic-life/graduation-and-retention/
[https:/ /perma.cc/2W8C-6ZZX] (last visited Sept. 27, 2020).
40. PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS, supra note 7, at 4.
41. Id.
42. STUDENT BORROWER PROT. CTR., PRIVATE STUDENT LENDING 11 (2020),
https :/ / protectborrowers .org/ wp-content/ uploads/ 2020 / 04/PSL-Report_042020. pdf
[https:/ /
perma.cc/GPP2-ZD8A ].
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS AND LAWSUITS
INVOLVING FOR-PROFIT SCHOOLS (2004-May 2014) 2, 12 (2014), https:/ /www.nclc.org/images/
pdf/pr-reports/for-profit-gov-investigations.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/3FUW-2SPW]. There have been
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Unfortunately, the Trump administration, led by Secretary of Education Betsy
De Vos, has reduced oversight of for-profit schools and attempted to block states
from taking action against bad actors, especially as it relates to federal student
loans. 45 Both President Donald Trump and Secretary of Education Betsy De Vos
have deep and troubling financial interests in the for-profit education sector. 46
However, there are plenty of reasons for states to become involved when private
student loans to for-profit school students are at issue.

1. The 90/10 Rule
For-profit schools have been the subject of inquiry for decades. The 90/10
rule is the result of multiple federal investigations into fraud and abuse in the
for-profit school industry dating back to the 1990s. 47 The rule applies only to
for-profit schools. It requires that any higher education institution must derive at
least ten percent of its revenue from sources other than federal financial aid,
including grants and federally subsidized student loans. 48 The rationale for the rule
was that, if the education was worth anything, others besides the federal government
would be willing to invest in it. 49 For-profit schools have complained that this law
unfairly targets them. 50 It does not apply to either public or nonprofit schools
because it does not need to. Research done by the Department of Education shows
that public institutions derive twenty-seven percent of their revenue from federal

other lawsuits since 2014, most notably those brought by the federal government and thirteen attorneys
general that forced the closing of Corinthian Colleges.
45. See Danielle Ivory, Erica L. Green & Steve Eder, Education Department Unwinds Unit
Investigating Fraud at For-Profit Schools, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2018), https:/ /www.nytimes.com/
2018/05/13/business/education-department-for-profit-colleges.html
[https:/ /perma.cc/H45P72MM]; Michael Stratford, De Vos Escalates Fight with States Over Student Loan Companies, POLITICO
(Sept. 7, 2018, 4:29 PM), https://www.pohtico.com/story/2018/09/07/devos-student-loancompanies-774599 [https:/ /perma.cc/QQR4-MD9C].
46. Tom Winter & Dartunorro Clark, Federal Court Approves $25 Million
University
Settlement, NBC NEWS (Feb. 6, 2018, 12:49 PM), https:/ /www.nbcnews.com/pohtics/whitehouse / federal-court-approves-25-million-trump-university-settlement-n845181
[http s: //perm a.cc/
E3N2-HJVE]; Ben Miller & Laura Jimenez, Inside the Financial Holdings of Billionaire Betsy De Vos,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Jan. 27, 2017, 2:24 PM), https:/ /www.americanprogress.org/
issues/ education-postsecondary/ news /2017 /01 /27 /2975 72/ inside-the-financial-holdings-ofbillionaire-betsy-devos/ [https:/ /perma.cc/7PMY-TSTH].
47. VIVIEN LEE & ADAM LOONEY, THE BROOKINGS INST., UNDERSTANDING THE 90/10
RULE: How RELIANT ARE PUBLIC, PRIVATE, AND FOR-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS ON FEDERAL Arn? 3
(2019), https:/ /www.brookings.edu/ wp-content/ uploads/ 2019 /01/ES_20190116_Looney-90-10.pdf
[https://perma.cc/985B-UULZ]. The rule was originally the 85/15 Rule but was subsequently
amended to be the 90/10 Rule. Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, 106
Stat. 448, 611, amended by Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112
Stat. 1581, 1588.
48. § 102, 112 Stat. at 1588.
49. Kelly Field, Senators Mull Changes in 90/ 10 Rule to Rein in For-Profits, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. (Mar. 2, 2011), https:/ /www.chronicle.com/ article/Senators-Mull-Changes-in-90-10/126564
[https://perma.cc/ESS6-8URB].
50. The Prosper Act, introduced by Representative Foxx of Virginia in 2017, would have
repealed the rule. It has not become law, but the idea has not died.
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aid and nonprofit institutions derive thirty-nine percent of revenue. 51 For-profit
institutions, on the other hand, rely on the federal government for ninety percent
of their revenue. 52 This heavy reliance on federal aid has led to abuses by
for-profit schools.
Corinthian Colleges have become the poster child for these abuses. In 2014,
the CFPB sued Corinthian and a judgment was entered in favor of the CFPB a year
later. 53 The complaint outlines how the school used the 90/10 rule to burden their
students with predatory private student debt. 54 Corinthian students could not rely
on federal student aid for more than ninety percent of the tuition. 55 Therefore,
Corinthian raised its tuition so that the maximum allowable federal loans would
cover ninety percent of the tuition. 56 The rest would then be covered by private
"Genesis" student loans created by and for Corinthian. 57 \X/hile the loans were
originated by a third party, Corinthian had an obligation to repurchase the loans
either immediately or if they became delinquent. More than sixty percent became
delinquent. As the CFPB alleged in their complaint, colleges like Corinthian have a
strong financial incentive to push these private student loans. 58 Every dollar in
private loans they induced a student to incur allowed them to receive an additional
nine dollars in Title IV aid.59
To fully appreciate how much Corinthian inflated the tuition, a comparison is
necessary. In 2013, the cost of a bachelor's degree at Corinthian Colleges was
between $60,096 and $75,384. 60 The same degree at Harvard cost slightly less than
$55,000. 61 A similar degree at a state school would cost about $9,700. 62 No rational
person believes that a Corinthian degree has more value than the alternatives. This
is a common feature of for-profit education. They charge much higher prices for

51. LEE & LOONEY, supra note 47, at 4.
52. Id.
53. CFPB Sues For-Profit Corinthian Colleges for Predatory Lending Scheme, CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Sept. 16, 2014), https:/ /www.consumerfinance.gov/ about-us/newsroom/cfpbsues-for-profit-corinthian-colleges-for-predatory-lending-scheme / [http s: / / perma.cc / 2Q MW-6L36 ];

CFPB Wins Default Judgment Against Corinthian Colleges for Engaging in a Predatory Lending Scheme,
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Oct. 28, 2015), https:/ /www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus / newsroom/ cfp b-wins-defau1t-judgment-agains t-corin thian-colleges-for-engaging-in- a-predatorylending-scheme / [https:/ /perma.cc/H3NV-MFFC].
54. Complaint at 10, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Corinthian Coils., No. 1:14-CV-07194,
2014 WL 5786691 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2014).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 4.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 8.
61. Frank Ohto, Here's How the Cost of Harvard Has Changed Throughout the Years,
Bus. INSIDER (June 10, 2019, 8:57 AM), https:/ /www.businessinsider.com/how-the-cost-of-harvardhas-changed-throughout-the-years2019-6 [https:/ /perma.cc/C7TR-TEPF].
62. COLLEGEBOARD, TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2019, at 12 (2019) [hereinafter
TRENDS],
https :/ / research.collegeboard.org/ pdf/ trends-college-pricing-2019-full-report.pdf
[https:/ /perma.cc/Z2B4-FNXF].
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degrees than comparable public institutions. The Government Accounting Office
did an investigation of for-profit schools and discovered significant tuition
inflation. 63 Some of the results can be seen in the chart below.
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Figure 1: Examples of For-profit versus Public Higher Education Tuition 64
The for-profit industry has long complained that this 90/ 10 rule is unfair. 65
The Brookings Institute recently studied the 90/10 rule and found the opposite to
be true. 66 According to their investigation, nearly all public (99.9%) and private
nonprofit (95.7%) schools comply with the rule. 67 For-profit schools, on the other
hand, do not, with nearly twenty percent of the for-profit two-year schools and
fifteen percent of the for-profit four-year schools relying on federal dollars for
more than ninety percent of their income. 68 Those private nonprofit schools that
are failing are doing so primarily because of online and distance learning education. 69
In addition, schools with higher than 90 / 10 ratios-in other words schools that are
relying too much on federal dollars-are of lower quality and have higher student
default rates. 70
An undercover investigation of fifteen online programs at for-profit schools
highlighted some of the quality issues for-profit school students face. 71 At one

63. U.S.
Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF.,
GAO-10-948T,
FOR-PROFIT
COLLEGES: UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS COLLEGES ENCOURAGED FRAUD AND ENGAGED IN
DECEPTIVE AND QUESTIONABLE MARKETING PRACTICES 18 tbl.3 (2010) [hereinafter GAO-10948T], https:/ /www.gao.gov/new.items/d10948t.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/QZV7-8ST8].
64. Id. at 18.
65. See LEE & LOONEY, supra note 47, at 3.
66. Id. at 16.
67. Id. at 8 tbl.1.
68. Id. at 6 fig.1.
69. Id. at 7.
70. Id. at 14.
71. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-150, FOR-PROFIT SCHOOLS: EXPERIENCES
OF UNDERCOVER STUDENTS ENROLLED IN ONLINE CLASSES AT SELECTED COLLEGES (2011)
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college, for instance, the test student was charged for a laptop when he enrolled. 72
The student told the college he did not want a laptop computer but was told to "fill
out the 'laptop agreement form' anyway." 73 The student asked how to return the
laptop, but got no reply. 74 Of course, the cost of this unwanted laptop was charged
to the student. The testers also documented instances of lax or inconsistent
academic standards. 75 Online education poses some of the most significant issues
because it is so difficult to monitor. For-profit schools dominate the online
education sector. 76 The fundamental problem with for-profit schools is that they
simply do not deliver a good product, especially considering its cost.
2. Student Outcomes

Studies have shown that people who attend for-profit schools do not fare well
in the labor market. In fact, students who attend a for-profit school are more likely
to be unemployed, and those who are employed earn less than comparable students
who attend public or private nonprofit schools.77 Corinthian, like many for-profit
schools, inflated its job placement statistics to entice students to enroll. The school
knew its students had "[m]inimal to nonexistent understanding of basic financial
concepts," making them the perfect target for predatory loan products. 78
Many students who enroll in for-profit schools are first-generation college
students. 79 They are more likely to be poor and more likely to be minorities. 80
Communities of color "are more likely to experience delinquency or default." 81 In
fact, ten percent of all black undergraduates attend a for-profit schools. 82 All these
factors made these students very vulnerable to abuse. The students are trying to do
what they had been told to do to be successful, get a college education. Instead, they
ended up with a nearly worthless degree and massive student debt-if they
graduated at all. In 2017, the six-year graduation rate (the number of students who

[hereinafter
GA0-12-150], https:/ /www.gao.gov/ assets/590/586456.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/
H86W-J3LT].
72. Id. at 9.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 7.
76. See infra Section II.B.2.
77. CAREN A. ARBEIT & LAURA HORN, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., A PROFILE OF THE
ENROLLMENT PATTERNS AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF UNDERGRADUATES AT
FOR-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS 3 (2017), https:/ /nces.ed.gov/pubs2017 /2017416.pdf [https:/ /
perma.cc /EJT7-E3XJ].
78. Complaint, supra note 54, at 3.
79. ARBEIT & HORN, supra note 77, at 11.
80. Aissa Canchola & Seth Frotman, The Significant Impact of Student Debt on Communities of
Color, Blog for CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Sept.
15,
2016),
https:/ /
www.consumerfinance.gov/ about-us /blog/ significant-impact-student-debt-communities-color/ [https :/ /
perm a.cc/GU 66-QZP9].
81. Id.
82. TRENDS, supra note 62, at 32 fig.23A.
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began their education in 2011 and completed it by 2017) at for-profit schools was
only twenty-one percent.83
For-profit institutions market heavily to military students. As a result,
"[m]ilitary students constitute[] a larger percentage of students in for-profit
four-year institutions than in all other institutions." 84 Military students bring unique
financial benefits to for-profit schools. The federal government has enacted a
number of programs that will pay for educational programs for both active duty
soldiers and veterans. 85 This is especially attractive to for-profit schools because
these federal funds are not counted in the ninety percent for purposes of the 90/10
rule. 86 As a result, a veteran has used his or her entire GI benefit at a for-profit
school only to discover the degree is worthless. 87 This is more insidious when
considered in combination with the heavy marketing done by the military to entice
usually low-income minority enlistees with the hope of a free college education.
Even as civilian enrollment in for-profit colleges declined, military enrollment
increased. 88 The University of Phoenix alone enrolled 50,000 veterans after the Iraq
and Afghanistan deployments, earning $345 million in federal benefits. 89
We traditionally think of college students as young, recent graduates from high
school. For the most part, they are. 90 However, many older Americans have been
encouraged-especially after the Great Recession-to go back to school to become
better able to earn a living in the modem economy. Higher education is no longer
seen as a broad opportunity to gain knowledge. It is viewed as being directly
connected to your future earning potential. Older students are more likely to attend
a for-profit institution. 91 As a result, when labor markets decrease, enrollment in
local for-profit schools increases. 92 This makes sense, especially for older students
who may have family obligations that do not permit them to attend schools farther
from home. Lower-income students also attend in larger numbers, probably for
similar reasons. Unfortunately, most students who attend a for-profit college are

83. Fast Facts, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=40
[https:/ /perma.cc/FH2K-BYJ4] (last visited Sept. 27, 2020).
84. ARBEIT & HORN, supra note 77, at 6, 16.
85. Christopher J. Salemme, Unpatriotic Profit: How For-Profit Colleges Target Veterans and
What the Government Must Do to Stop Them, 32 BYU J. PUB. L. 89, 98-99 (2017).
86. Id. at 101.
87. Id. at 89-90.
88. Id. at 91.
89. Id.
90. During the 2011-2012 academic year, 56.2% of all undergraduates were twenty-three or
younger. ARBEIT & HORN, supra note 77, at 12 tbl.2.
91. Id. at 2.
92. See Luis Armona, Rajashri Chakrabarti & Michael F. Lovenheim, How Does For-Profit
College Attendance Affect Student Loans, Defaults, and Labor Market Outcomes? 24 (EconStor, Working
Paper No. 811, 2017), https:/ /www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/189852 [https:/ /perma.cc/
R4AW-KSW4].
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worse off. They do not get the promised increase in income and they leave with a
mountain of debt. 93

3. Deceptive Advertisement and Lead Generators
The Government Accounting Office has conducted extensive investigations
of for-profit schools. 94 In one of its investigations, undercover testers were sent to
fifteen for-profit colleges and found fraudulent practices related to the FAFSA
application in nearly a third. 95 Several schools were encouraging students to falsify
their F AFSA applications to qualify for more aid than they were legally eligible to
receive. 96 Several of the schools refused to even discuss financial aid until they
committed to enrollment. 97 More significantly, all fifteen schools engaged in
deceptive, even fraudulent, statements related to their accreditation, job prospects,
and graduation rates.98
Inflated and often fraudulent representations about job prospects and earning
potential are among the most common questionable practices of for-profit schools.
The research clearly documents that attending a for-profit school does not lead to
the career advancements promised. 99 This has not stopped the industry from
claiming otherwise. Students were given false information about the employment
success of its students. De V ry promised ninety percent employment in a student's
respective field. 100 When the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) investigated, it
found that the reality did not match the marketing. 101 De Vry had a very loose-the
FTC would say deceptive-way of measuring employment in the field. 102 For
example, one student with a degree in administration was working as a waiter and
another with a degree in technical management was a clerk in a department store. 103
While De V ry denied the allegation in its settlement with the FTC, a look at its most
recent employment disclosures shows a more realistic picture of its graduate

Stephanie Riegg Cellini & Nicolas Turner, Gainfully Employed? Assessing the Employment
of For-Profit College Students Using Administrative Data 26 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 2287, 2016, revised 2018), https:/ /www.nber.org/papers/w22287.pdf
[https://perma.cc/47CZ-Q4AD].
94. See, eg., GAO-10-948T, supra note 63; GAO-12-150, supra note 71.
95. GAO-10-948T, supra note 63, at 7.
96. Id. at 8 tbl.1.
97. Id. at 11.
98. Id. at 9.
99. See Cellini & Turner, supra note 93.
100. Michael Vasquez, De V ry U. Accused of Using Phony Job Placement Rates, MIAMI HERALD
(Jan. 27, 2016, 9:56 P:M), https:/ /www.miamiherald.com/news/local/education/article56933743.html
[https:/ /perma.cc/GNQ2-MN3P].
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.; Lesley Fair, FTC Case Against DeVry Yields $100 Million Settlement, FED. TRADE
COMM'N (Dec. 15, 2016, 11:59 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/businessblog/ 2016/ 12/ ftc-case-agains t-devry-yields-100-milhon-settlement?page=2
[https: / / perma.cc/
638S-JVL8].
93.

and Earnings

2020]

FORGOTTEN BORROWERS

57

outcomes. Very few of its graduates are finding jobs in their field of study. 104 In
most cases, no one was employed and in a vast number of categories, fewer than
one quarter of the students had found employment in their field of study. 105
University of Phoenix is part of the Apollo Education Group, one of the
largest for-profit conglomerates. 106 It recently settled a similar action brought by
the Federal Trade Commission involving this kind of deceptive advertising
practice. 107 Unlike DeVry, University of Phoenix was not claiming certain
employment numbers, just outcomes. University of Phoenix's ad campaign featured
companies like Twitter, Microsoft, Adobe, and Yahoo, leaving the viewer with the
impression that its graduates worked for these companies. 108 They did not. 109 These
are just a few examples of what has been a common practice in the industry: luring
students with false claims of employment and financial success.
Aggressive recruiting tactics that misrepresent the program itself have been
another common practice in this industry. Attorneys general from numerous states,
later joined by the federal government, sued Education Management Corporation
(EMC) alleging, among other things, that it paid its recruiters bonuses in violation
of federal law based on the number of students they enrolled. 110 In addition, the
schools offered certificates in fields when their programs were not accredited.
Brown Mackie, an EMC school with locations in South Bend, Indiana, offered a
radiology technology certification. The Notre Dame Clinical Law Center had
numerous clients who acquired student loan debt to complete this degree.
Unfortunately, the program was not accredited, and despite a need for such
employees in the area, students who completed the course could not
find employment.
The Obama administration took action to curb these particular abuses when
it enacted the gainful employment rule. 111 In order to be eligible for federal student
loan funds, schools were required to document that their programs met certification

104. DEVRY UNIVERSITY EMPLOYMENT OUTCOME DISCLOSURES (2020),
https:/ /
www.devry.edu/ d/ graduate-employment-outcomes.pd£ [https:/ / perma.cc/HUP7-ULDJ].
105. Id.
106. Vicente M. Lechuga, Who Are They? And What Do They Do?, in FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES
AND UNIVERSITIES: THEIR MARKETS, REGULATION, PERFORMANCE, AND PLACE IN HIGHER
EDUCATION 47, 51 (Guilbert C. Hentschke, Vicente M. Lechuga & William G. Tierney eds., 2010).
107. Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, FTC Reaches $191 Million Settlement with University of Phoenix
in Deceptive-Advertising Probe, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2019, 10:44 AM), https:/ /
www.washingtonpost.com/ education/ 2019/12/10 / ftc-reaches-million-settlement-with-universityphoenix-deceptive-advertising-probe/ [https:/ /perma.cc/TNX7-9DCW].
108. Id.
109. Cellini & Turner, supra note 93.
110. Stephanie Saul, For-Profit College Operator EDMC Will Forgive Student Loans, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 16, 2015), https:/ /www.nytimes.com/2015/11/17 /us/for-profit-college-operator-edmc-willforgive-student-loans.html [https:/ /perma.cc/FCB3-DGUY].
111. 34 C.F.R. § 600 (1994); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Obama Administration
Announces Final Rules to Protect Students from Poor-Performing College Programs (Oct. 30,
2014), https://www.ed.gov/ news/press-releases/ obama-administration-announces-final-rules-protectstudents-poor-performing-career-college-programs [https:/ /perma.cc/2MGL-957X].
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requirements and that a certain minimum number of their graduates found gainful
employment. 112 Secretary of Education Betsy De Vos and the Trump administration
moved swiftly to protect their personal interests in the for-profit school market and
repealed the gainful employment rule. 113 Then, with virtually no pre-warning, the
Department of Education changed its policies and announced it would no longer
disclose records to law enforcement agencies. 114 Attorneys general objected
strenuously. Only by obtaining this information could attorneys general fulfill their
role to protect the "nation's student loan borrowers from unfair, deceptive, and
predatory practices in the higher education field, as well as state regulators' roles in
licensing and supervising schools." 115 Clearly, Ms. DeVos is more interested in
protecting the for-profit industry from the prying eyes of investigators than
providing the attorneys general the information needed to protect students.
Another troubling aspect of the industry is its use oflead generators to recruit
students. The Federal Trade Commission recently took action against two such
companies, Sunkey Publishing, Inc. and Fanmail.com, LLC. 116 These companies
created websites with names like navyenlist.com and armyenlist.com, which they
populated with pictures of military men and women. Site visitors were asked to
complete a "U.S. Army Information Request" with their name and other relevant
information, as if they were applying to enlist. 117 Instead, their information was sent
to for-profit schools who informed them that the military really wanted to enlist
them, but they needed a college degree first. 118 Students were told not to worry
about the costs, the school would lend the money. 119 Through this fraudulent

112. 34 C.F.R. § 668.403 (2014).
113. David Whitman & Ame Duncan, Betsy DeVos and Her Cone of Silence on For-Profit
Colleges, BROOKINGS (Oct. 17, 2018), https:/ /www.brookings.edu/research/betsy-devos-for-profitcolleges-education-america/ [https:/ /perma.cc/BE9N-6VUF]; Diana Hembree, Investigations into
For-Profit College Abuses Dismantles Under Betsy De Vos, FORBES (May 14, 2018, 4:18 PM), https:/ /
www.forbes.com/ sites/ dianahembree/ 2018/ 05 / 14/ education-department-dismantles-team-thatinvestigated-for-profit-college-abuses/#d2977747ce0a [https:/ /perma.cc/HP5K-RV9V].
114. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896; System of Records, 83
Fed. Reg. 27587, 27588 (June 13, 2018).
115. Letter from Gurbir S. Grewal, Bob Ferguson, Xavier Becerra, Cynthia H. Coffman,
George Jepsen, Matthew P. Denn, Karl A. Racine, Russell A. Suzuki, Lisa Madigan, Thomas J. Miller,
Janet T. Mills, Brian E. Frosh, Maura Healey, Lori Swanson, Barbara D. Underwood,Joshua H. Stein,
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Josh Shapiro, Peter F. K.ilmartin & Mark R. Herring, Att'ys Gen. of New Jersey,
Washington, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawai'i, Illinois, Iowa,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island & Virginia, to Betsy DeVos, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Educ. (July 13, 2018),
https:/ / ag.ny.gov /sites/ default/ files/ final_nj_wa_privacy_act_letter_ 7.13.18.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/
46KQ-SPZ4].
116. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Takes Action Against the Operators of Copycat
Military Websites (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/09/ftctakes-action-agains t-operators-copycat-military-websites [https ://perm a.cc/ UJ 4T-53W6].
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Complaint for Civil Penalties, Permanent Injunction, and Other Equitable Relief at 35,
United States v. Sunkey Publ'g, Inc., No. 3:18-cv-01444, 2018 WL 4282853 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 6, 2018).
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scheme, many young men and women who had hoped to enlist in the military were
instead steered to for-profit schools where they were enrolled in effectively useless
programs that did nothing to improve their chance of enlistment. In fact, for many
it hurt them in achieving their goal. Debt is considered a security risk and a proposed
enlistee with too much debt will not be eligible for certain security clearances,
barring certain career paths. 120
In a similar case, the FTC brought an enforcement action against several
for-profit schools and their lead generators for setting up fraudulent websites that
looked like job postings. 121 The websites would trick people into providing their
names and other personal information, allegedly as a means to applying for a job. 122
Instead, the information was passed on to for-profit schools who used aggressive
marketing techniques to convince these vulnerable people looking for a job that the
way to become employed is to enroll in a for-profit school and take out thousands
of dollars in loans.123

4. Servicing Abuses
Regardless of who originates a student loan, the federal government or a
financial institution, a student loan is more likely than not to be serviced by a third
party. Currently, three servicers dominate the industry: Navient (formerly Sallie
Mae), Nelnet, and AES/Federal Loan Servicing. 124 More than 13,000 complaints
have been lodged with the CFPB regarding private student loans, many regarding
servicing issues. 125 NerdWallet analyzed the 2015 CFPB complaints and revealed
that dealing with the servicer was the most common reason for filing a complaint. 126
In 2015, the CFPB issued a "Request for Information Regarding Student Loan

120. See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 710 app. A (2020) ("Failure to live with one's means, satisfy debts, and
meet financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to abide
by rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness,
and ability to protect classified or sensitive information.").
121. Lesley Fair, Settlement with Operator of Post-Secondary Schools Offer an Education About
Lead Generation, FED. TRADE COMM'N (Aug. 27, 2019, 11:55 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/newseven ts /blo gs/business-blog/ 2019 / 08 /settlement-operator-past-secondary- schools-a ffers-education
[https://perma.cc/3UXK-63V3].
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Matt Carter, 'Big Four' Student Loan Servicers Now 'Big Three,' CREDIBLE (Feb. 8, 2018),
https:/ /www.credible.com/news/student-loans/big-four-student-loan-servicers-now-three/ [https:/ /
perm a.cc/ QBB 7-9999].
125. Consumer
Complaint
Database,
CONSUMER
FIN.
PROT.
BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ data-research/ consumer-complaints/ search/?dataNormahzation =
N one&dateRange = All&date_received_max=2020-10-04&date_received_min =2011-12-0l&searchField =
all&searchText=privatestudentloan&tab=Map
[https:/ /perma.cc/72H6-HHFP]
(last
visited
Sept. 27, 2020).
126. Victoria Simons & Anna Helhoski, Thousands of Grads File Complaints About Dealing with
Private
Student Loan
Companies, NERDWALLET: LOANS BLOG
(Apr.
5, 2016),
https:/ /www.nerdwallet.com/blog/loans/student-loans/student-loan-cfpb-complaints/
[https:/ /
perma.cc/P38F-V48U].
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Servicing'' and received more than 7,000 responses. 127 Many of the comments
documented servicing abuses and errors. 128 Things have not improved since
that time.
The CFPB has taken action against several servicers for their practices in
servicing both federal and private student loans. In an action against Wells Fargo
Bank, the CFPB alleged the bank was engaged in illegal private student loan
servicing practices that increased costs and unfairly penalized certain loan
borrowers. 129 The unfair and unlawful practices engaged in by Wells Fargo included
"failing to provide important payment information to consumers, charging
consumers illegal fees, and failing to update inaccurate credit report information." 130
Ultimately, Wells Fargo was ordered to improve its student loan servicing practices,
in particular the application of partial payments, which the CFPB believed would
reduce the number of delinquent loans as well as the number oflate fees. 131 In 2017,
the CFPB took similar action against Navient. While some of the issues in the
complaint only pertain to federal loans, N avient has shown a pattern of activity that
impacts the private loans it services as well.1 32
Absent a meaningful stake in a loan's performance, student loan servicing
industry creates a similar principal-agent conflict that was seen during the mortgage
crisis in which servicers' incentives diverge from that of investors. 133 The market
was unable to "self-correct because neither [the mortgage] investors nor affected
homeowners ha[ d] the incentives or the bargaining power to fix the system." 134
As a group, student loan borrowers are even more vulnerable. They are
disproportionately underrepresented and need better consumer protections. In fact,
"research suggests higher rates of student loan defaults and delinquencies in ZIP
codes populated primarily by minorities with higher income levels." 135 These

127. 80 Fed. Reg. 29302 (May 21, 2015); CFPB Publishes Over 7,700 Consumer Complaint
Narratives About Financial Companies, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (June 25, 2015), https:/ /
www.consumerfinance.gov/ about-us/ newsroom/ cfpb-pubhshes-over- 7700-consumer-complaintnarratives-about-financial-companies/ [https:/ /perma.cc/JSE4-RFYP].
128. Request for Information Regarding Student Loan Servicing, REGULATIONS.GOV,
https :/ / www.regulations.gov/ docketBrowser?rpp = 50&so = D ESC&s b =pos tedD ate&po =0&dct= PS
&D=CFPB-2015-0021 [https:/ /perma.cc/GQE9-HTWN] (last visited Sept. 27, 2020) (Docket ID
No. CFPB-2015-0021).
129. CFPB Takes Action Against Wells Fargo for Loan Servicing Practices, CONSUMER
FIN.
PROT.
BUREAU
(Aug.
22,
2016)
[hereinafter
CFPB
Action],
https:/ /
www.consumerfinance.gov/ about-us/ newsroom/ cfpb-takes-action-agains t-wells-fargo-illegal-s tudentloan-servicing-practices / [https:/ /perma.cc/ S3S4-946B ].
130. Id. See generally Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0013 (Aug. 22, 2016),
https:/ / files.consumerfinance.gov / f/ documents/2016-CFPB-0013Wells_Fargo_Bank_N.A.--_Consent_
Order.pd£ [https:/ /perma.cc/FAT9-PX2W].
131. CFPB Acrion, supra note 129.
132. Complaint, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101-RDM, 2017
WL 191446 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017).
133. Adam Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE]. ON REGUL. 1, 69 (2011),
http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id = 1324023 [https:/ / perma.cc/ 6WEN-URGD].
134. Id.
135. Canchola & Frotman, supra note 80.
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statistics "raise concerns that millions of borrowers may not be getting information
about repayment options or may encounter breakdowns when attempting to enroll
in these plans." 136
As mentioned previously, for-profit schools aggressively market to military
students and, as a result, have a disproportionate number of military borrowers.
\X/hen a servicemember is on active duty, he or she is eligible for an interest rate
reduction to six percent. 137 Servicers have also illegally required active duty military
personnel to reapply or update the loan servicer periodically in order to maintain
the interest rate deduction. 138 A servicemember in a war zone certainly does not
have access to the documentation being demanded by the servicer. The servicers
create unnecessary, and often illegal, hurdles to prevent servicemembers from
accessing the rights federal law affords them. 139
C. Lack of Rights Under Exi.sting Law
For-profit school borrowers with private student loans face a unique lack of
rights under federal and state law. Section I.C.1 discusses the difference between
the rights given to borrowers of federal student loans versus the limited rights and
resources available for private student loan borrowers. Section I.C.2 places this
relative difference in the context of the bankruptcy discharge exception faced by all
student loan borrowers.

1. Private Student Loan Borrowers Lack Protections Afforded to Federal Student
Loan Borrowers
For federal student loan borrowers, the obstacles to discharge debt in
bankruptcy are counterbalanced by a panoply of rights. Private student loan
borrowers have no such protections.

a. Federal Student Loan Repayment and Discharge Rights
The federal student loan program has evolved to provide borrowers a broad
set of protections designed to ensure that the loans are affordable and repayment is
fair under the borrower's life circumstances. We describe these rights below in four
categories: repayment rights, disability discharge, school-related discharge, and
public service discharge.
Repayment rights are provided to federal student loan borrowers who can select
among a variety of loan terms and repayment schedules, although options depend
on the amount of the loan and the federal loan program under which the money

136. Id.
137. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3937.
138. HOLLISTER PETRAEUS & ROHIT CHOPRA, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, THE NEXT
FRONT? STUDENT LOAN SERVICING AND THE COST TO OUR MEN AND WOMEN IN UNIFORM 7
(2012), https:/ / files.consumerfinance.gov / f/201210_cfpb_servicemember-student-loan-servicing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7RKU-W8YF].
139. Id.
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was borrowed. 140 Most importantly, federal student loan borrowers have the option
to participate in a variety of income-driven repayment plans, depending on when
the loan was originated or disbursed. 141 For example, student borrowers in the Pay
As You Earn (PAYE) program pay ten percent of discretionary income or less, and
their loans are forgiven after twenty years of qualifying payments. 142 Income-driven
plans are designed for the purpose of making student loan payments affordable
regardless of the student's earnings after leaving school.1 43
The federal student loan program offers a variety of other rights for the
repayment ofloans that are not typical of consumer credit contracts. Federal student
loans are not declared in default until after 270 days of nonpayment. 144 To forestall
default, federal student loan borrowers can invoke rights to forbear on payment or
defer repayment. 145 Even after default, borrowers have a onetime right to
"consolidate" loans or a right to "rehabilitate" their loan status by making nine
months of payments in a specified amount. 146 And as noted above, the cost of the
loans also are a benefit, with interest rates much lower than private loans and
interest accumulating only upon leaving school.
Federal law allows discharge of federal student loan obligations for three
categories of events: disability, school-related, and public service. Disability discharge
is available to student loan borrowers who become totally and permanently
disabled. 147 Borrowers meeting the disability standard are subject to a review of

140. NAT'L CONSUMERL. CTR., STUDENT LOAN LAW§ 3.2 (6th ed. 2019).
141. Id.§ 3.3.1.
142. Id. The repayment history necessary to obtain forgiveness can be met under any one of
numerous criteria. Id. § 3.3.3.8.
143. John R. Brooks, The Case for More Debt: Expanding College Affordability by Expanding
Income-Driven Repayment, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 847,847 (2018) ("At its core, the promise of IDRis that
higher education will always be affordable, no matter what a person's income is after the person
leaves school.").
144. NAT'L CONSUMERL. CTR., supra note 140, § 6.2.1.
145. NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 140, § 4.4. Forbearance, however, has been misused
by servicers of federal student loans as a profitable catch-all response to repayment distress even when
students could have exercised IDR or other more appropriate repayment rights. Complaint, Consumer
Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101-R.DM, 2017 WL 191446 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017)
(alleging that N avient steers borrowers into forbearance instead of options in the best interests
of borrowers).
146. NAT'L CONSUMERL. CTR., supra note 140, §§ 7.2-.3.
147. 20 U.S.C. § 1087. The ED regulations mirror the statutory requirements, providing for
disability discharge when the borrower "(1) Is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that-(i) Can be expected to result
in death; (ii) Has lasted for a continuous period of not less than 60 months; or (iii) Can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 60 months; or (2) Has been determined by the Secretary
of Veterans Affairs to be unemployable due to a service-connected disability," and defining "substantial
gainful activity'' as "[ a] level of work performed for pay or profit that involves doing significant physical
or mental activities, or a combination of both." 34 C.F.R. § 685.102 (2020) (applicable to direct loans).
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income during the succeeding three years to verify continued disability. 148 Federal
student loans are discharged on death of the borrower. 149
School-related discharge is available if the school closes prior to the borrower's
completion of the program or if the school made a false certification to the
appropriate higher education certification authority. 15 False certification discharge
is available under Department of Education (ED) regulations based on falsely
certifying a non-high school graduate for a loan, forgery or identity theft, or
certifying "the eligibility of the student who, because of a physical or mental
condition, age, criminal record, or other reason accepted by the Secretary, would
not meet State requirements for employment ... in the occupation for which the
training program supported by the loan was intended." 151 School-related discharges
generally are not automatic but rather require an application for discharge be filed
by the student borrower and approved by the ED. 152
Another right of federal student loan borrowers that we categorize as a form
of school-related discharge is administrative loan cancellation by the ED due to
school misconduct, which is commonly referred to as ''borrower defense." A
borrower can present a defense to federal student loan repayment based on failure
by the school to perform contractual obligations or the school engaged in a
"substantial misrepresentation." 153 The ED promulgated a new rule related to
borrower defense in 2016, but the Trump administration under Secretary of
Education Betsy De Vos attempted to delay the implementation of the rule. A
federal court vacated this action, thus leaving the rule in effect, but the end result
has been confusion as to the use of the borrower defense rule. 154
Finally,public service discharge is available to student borrowers entering certain
professions. The Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program, enacted in 2007,

°

148. NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 140, § 10.8.2 (describing three-year period and
history of disability discharge process).
149. 20 u.s.c. § 1087.
150. NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 140, § 10.3.1 (closed school discharge); id.§ 10.4.1
(false certification). Federal student loan borrowers also can discharge loans based on unpaid refunds
by the school. Id. § 10.5.1.
151. 34 C.F.R. § 685.215(a)(iv) (2020) (direct loans). Higher education institutions can certify a
student's "ability to benefit" in lieu of a high school diploma to qualify the student for federal funding.
20 U.S.C. § 1091(d)(1)(A)(ii). Discharge is available for students who falsely certified under this
criterion. 34 C.F.R. § 685.215(a)(1)(i)(B) (2020). Borrowers under the discontinued FFEL program had
analogous rights. 78 Fed. Reg. 65768, 65768 (Nov. 1, 2013).
152. If Your School Closes While You're Enrolled or Soon After You Withdraw, You May Be
Eligible for Discharge of Your Federal Student Loan, FED. STUDENT Arn, https:/ /
studentaid.gov /manage-loans/forgiveness-cancellation/ closed-school
[https:/ / perm a.cc/ 652TWV5B] (last visited Sept. 27, 2020); You Might Be Eligible for a Discharge of Your Federal Student Loans
Based on False Certification, FED. STUDENT Arn, https:/ /studentaid.gov/manage-loans/forgivenesscancellation/false-certification [https://perma.cc/5XST-8YV6] (last visited Sept. 27, 2020).
153. NAT'L CONSUMERL. CTR., supra note 140, §§ 10.6.1, .2.3 (describing the development and
limits of the borrower defense rule).
154. 34 C.F.R. § 685.222 (2020) (explaining ED regulations pertaining to direct loans disbursed
after June 2017); Bauer v. DeVos, 332 F. Supp. 3d 181 (D.D.C. 2018); see NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR.,
supra note 140, § 10.
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allows student borrowers working for a public service employer and making
income-driven repayment (IDR) payments to discharge the debt after ten years,
rather than waiting the twenty or twenty-five years typically required for discharge
with IDR. 155 Careers eligible for PSLF discharge include those that "traditionally
feature more modest wages, relative to many private sector fields that require
comparable levels of advanced education," with "nearly two thirds (62 percent) of
borrowers who have certified intent to pursue PSLF reported earning less than
$50,000 per year." 156 Similarly, college graduates who teach in certain low-income
schools can receive up to $17,500 in loan forgiveness, 157 and there are other targeted
federal and state loan forgiveness programs based on service in professions with
public benefi t. 158
Disability, closed school, false certification, and PSLF discharge result in full
debt cancellation, while a successful borrower defense application can result in a
partial cancellation of the remaining debt. 159 Federal student loan borrowers can use
all of these repayment and discharge rights to which they are entitled; they are not
mutually exclusive. 160 It is important to note that the existence of these federal rights
is a different matter than effective implementation of these rights. The ED and its
contracted servicers have been severely and repeatedly criticized for failing to
properly implement, or actively obstructing borrower use of, these rights. 161

155. 20 U.S.C. § 1087e(m); 34 C.F.R. § 685.219 (2020).
156. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STAYING ON TRACK WHILE GIVING BACK: THE COST
OF STUDENT LOAN SERVICING BREAKDOWNS FOR PEOPLE SERVING THEIR COMMUNITIES 7, 21
(2017) [hereinafter CFPB 2017 REPORT], https:/ / files.consumerfinance.gov / f/ documents/
201706_cfpb_PSLF-midyear-report.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/Y2X4-T7MJ].
157. NAT'L CONSUMERL. CTR., supra note 140, § 10.11.
158. Id.§§ 10.12-.13; see, e.g., Richard P. Eckman, Albert H. Manwaring IV & Kelly R. Bryan,
Heroes Act Gives Loan Relief to Reservists on Active Duty, 58 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 205 (2004)
(describing student loan relief available to U.S. military reservists who are called to active duty, those
working disaster areas, and other similar groups).
159. NAT'L CONSUMERL. CTR., supra note 140, § 10.7.
160. One potential downside of federal student loan discharge rights is that many loan
discharges currently result in an attribution of taxable income for the cancellation of the debt. NAT'L
CONSUMERL. CTR., supra note 140, § 10.15.1.
161. First, in the realm of disability discharge there are multiple examples of this failure.
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GA0-17-45, SOCIAL SECURITY OFFSETS: IMPROVEMENTS TO
PROGRAM DESIGN COULD BETTER ASSIST OLDER STUDENT LOAN BORROWERS WITH OBTAINING
PERMITTED RELIEF (2016); Letter from Chris Coons, Rob Portman & Angus King, U.S. Sens., to Betsy
De Vos, Sec'y of Educ., U.S. Dep't of Educ., David Shulkin, Sec'y of Veteran Affs., U.S. Dep't of
Veteran Affs. & Nancy Berryhill, Acting Comm'r of Soc. Sec., U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin. (Feb. 15, 2018),
https:/ /www.coons.senate.gov/news/press-releases/with-new-tax-law-in-place-sens-coons-king-portmanurge-trump-administration-to-discharge-outstanding-federal-student-loans-for-totally-and-permanentlydisabled-americans [https:/ /perma.cc/24N4-XS5D]; Clare Lombardo & Cory Turner, Student Loan
Borrowers with Disabilities Aren't Getting Help They Were Promised, NPR (Dec. 4, 2019, 5:00 AM),
https :/ / www.npr.org/ 2019 / 12/ 04/776058798/ why-s tudent-loan-borrowers-with-disabilities-arentgetting-the-help-they-deserve [https:/ /perma.cc/L5VS-XZCL]. This failure is evident in the public
service context as well. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GA0-18-547, PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN
FORGIVENESS: EDUCATION NEEDS TO PROVIDE BETTER INFORMATION FOR THE LOAN SERVICER
AND BORROWERS (2018) (reporting only 55 of 19,321 applicants were granted a PSLF discharge of
remaining student loan obligations because of ED administrative obstacles); U.S. Gov'T
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b. Private Student Loan Borrowers Lack Analogous Rights
The borrower defense rule substantially aligns with the protections afforded
to private student loan borrowers under the FTC Holder Rule, as discussed in Part
II.1 62 Other than this exception, private student loan borrowers have no analogous
rights under federal or state law to the plethora of repayment or discharge
protections afforded to federal student loan borrowers.

Figure 2: Lack of Protections for Private Student Loan Borrowers
For the most part, private student loan lenders are bound only by general
commercial law, including the law of contracts and tort, unfair and deceptive acts
and practices (UDAP) law, and the like. Depending on the contract terms, lenders
can declare private student loan borrowers in default after one missed payment or
even impose universal default clauses that allow debt acceleration and collection
even when the borrower is current on payments. 163 The National Consumer Law

ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-595, PUBLIC SERVICE LOAN FORGIVENESS: IMPROVING THE
TEMPORARY EXPANDED PROCESS COULD HELP REDUCE BORROWER CONFUSION (2019) (reporting
that ED again rejected ninety-nine percent of PSLF applicants after Congressional temporary extension
of program due to prior mass denials); CFPB 2017 REPORT, supra note 156, at 33 (detailing examples
of servicing misconduct in PSLF program); Adam Minsky, What It's like to Apply for Public Service
Loan Forgiveness, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2019, 12:19 P:M), https:/ /www.forbes.com/sites/
adamminsky / 2019/08/13 / what-its-like-to-apply-for-public-service-loan-forgiveness
[https:/ /
perma.cc/D265-BKV3] (providing an example of how the ED servicing process stymies obtaining
PSLF discharge); Cory Turner & Chris Arnold, Dept. of Education Fail: Teachers Lose Grants, Forced to
Repay Thousands in Loans, NPR (Mar. 28, 2018, 5:01 AM), https:/ /www.npr.org/
sections/ ed/ 2018/03/28 / 596162853 / dept-of-education-fail-teachers-lose-grants-forced-to-repaythousands-in-loans [https:/ /perma.cc/9VWY-KKFS]. The failure is also present in terms of
income-driven repayment. CFPB 2017 REPORT, supra note 156; U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-15-663, FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS: EDUCATION COULD DO MORE TO HELP ENSURE
BORROWERS ARE AWARE OF REPAYMENT AND FORGIVENESS OPTIONS (2015); Complaint,
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101-RDM, 2017 WL 191446
(M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017) (alleging that Navient steers borrowers into forbearance instead of options in
the best interests of borrowers).
162. See infra Section II.A.
163. But see PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS, supra note 7, at 13 (suggesting 120 days is the norm for
declaration of default on private student loans).
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Center (NCLC) summarized the situation facing private student loan borrowers
as follows:
Unlike the federal student loan programs, there is no comprehensive
federal law requiring private student lenders to offer particular types of
relief or flexible repayment. Private student loan borrowers are generally at
the mercy of their creditors. Unfortunately, private lenders have been
generally inflexible in trying to assist financially distressed borrowers. 164
IDR-a critical component of the federal student loan program protections
against borrower penury from education debt-is not a feature of the typical private
student loan product for for-profit school students. 165 Similarly, no federal or state
law provides private student loan borrowers a right to discharge debt on total
disability, when a school closes, or for public service. Some lenders may voluntarily
forbear or modify debts, but these actions typically are not contractual rights of the
private student loan debtor but rather the calculation of a creditor as to whether
loan modification offers a better chance for the recovery of money than obtaining
a court judgment and pursuing collection. 166
Private student loan borrowers have protections unavailable to federal student
loan borrowers to the extent that some general laws of commerce and consumer
lending apply to private student loans that are preempted by the Higher Education
Act (}-[EA) or exclude federal student loans. For example, state usury limits can
apply to private student loans but are preempted as to federal student loans. 167
Disclosure requirements under federal law are governed by the Truth in Lending
Act (TILA), including special provisions for private student loans, while disclosures
for federal student loans are stated in the HEA. 168
Substantive protections for private student loan borrowers are almost
nonexistent under state law. Three states have enacted limited laws focusing on
conflict of interest in private student loan origination or requiring disclosures at
origination. A 2013 Oklahoma law prohibits using school mascots or the like in

164. NAT'L CONSUMERL. CTR., supra note 140, § 12.7.1.
165. Some private student loans are in the form of income-share agreements. These loans have
become newly popular as an emerging fintech product targeted at students in higher education
programs leading to high-income occupations, but such loans are highly unhkely to be offered to
for-profit school students. See Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Human Equity? Regulating the New Income
Share Agreements, 68 VAND. L. REV. 681 (2015) (describing the new wave of income share agreements
and arguing against comprehensive regulation).
166. A few of the larger private student loan lenders have publicly announced that they would
consider a death or disability discharge on some loan programs, but these actions generally are limited
to the discretion of the lender and are not widely available. NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note
140, § 12.7.4.1.
167. 20 U.S.C. § 1078(d) (making state law "which limits the rate or amount of interest"
inapplicable to federal loan that complies with rate requirements in HEA).
168. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1638(e) (Truth in Lending Act disclosure provisions for private
education loans), and 12 C.F.R. § 1026.46 (2020) (Regulation Z disclosure provisions for private
education loans), with 15 U.S.C. § 1603(7) (dictating that loans under Title IV of the Higher Education
Act do not apply to TILA). See NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 140, § 2.5.1 (federal loan
disclosures); id.§ 12.4.1.1 (private loan disclosures).

2020]

FORGOTTEN BORROWERS

67

marketing private loans and prohibits school financial aid officers from personally
profiting from private loans. 169 The State of Washington amended its higher
education licensing law in 2018 to prohibit for-profit vocational school owners
from profiting from private student loans, but the law narrowly applies to schools
opening or renewing operations within the last two years and has exceptions
allowing for such loans. 170 And California higher education licensing law requires
certain disclosures about private and federal student loans. 171 The authors are
unaware of any state law that attempts to provide any of the postorigination federal
student loan repayment or discharge rights to private student loan borrowers that
are available under federal law for borrowers with federal student loans. 172

2. Justifications for the Bankruptcy Discharge Exception
Student loans generally are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. It was not always
so. Prior to 1976, student loans were treated no differently than other types of debts
in bankruptcy. 173 Federal student loans first were subject to a waiting period before
becoming dischargeable-of five years from 1976 to 1990, then extended to seven
years in 1990. 174 The 1998 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code eliminated the
waiting period and instead made federal student loans of any duration discharge able
only if the debtor proves "undue hardship." 175 Following the imposition of this
restriction on bankruptcy discharge, the use of bankruptcy ceased to be a widely
available tool for distressed federal student loan borrowers. 176 Even when a student

169. OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A, § 3-704 (2013). The Oklahoma law also prohibits prepayment
penalties, but that is a right that exists in federal law for all student loans, including under TILA for
private student loans. 15 U.S.C. § 1650(e).
170. 2018 Wash. Sess. Laws 1235-36 (amending WASH. REV. CODE§ 28C.10.050 (2018)).
171. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 69800 (West 2016) (stating that higher education institutions must
"[c]learly distinguish private loans from federal loans in individual financial aid awards");
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 69800.2 (West 2017) (requiring disclosures about the availability of federal
student loans).
172. The most substantial movement in state laws affecting private student loan borrowers is
the growing number of states enacting licensing laws for student loan servicing of all types of student
loans, including private student loans. See Walter Suskind, Supporting States in the Fight to Protect
Borrowers, Blog for STUDENT BORROWER PROT. CTR. (Sept. 23, 2019), https:/ /protectborrowers.org/
supporting-states-in-the-fight-to-protect-borrowers/ [https:/ /perma.cc/ 6BZU-FPR2] (describing and
listing states with servicing licensing laws).
173. Daniel A. Austin, The Indentured Generation: Bankruptcy and Student Loan Debt, 53 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 329, 363 (2013).
174. Between 1976 and 1990, the student debtor had to wait five years to discharge a loan in
bankruptcy. That period was extended to seven years between 1990 and 1998. Id. at 363-64.
175. Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat. 1837 (eliminating
seven-year limit on requiring proof of undue hardship).
176. PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS, supra note 7, at 71 (stating that student loans "are virtually
immune from discharge in bankruptcy''). Whether undue hardship is an insurmountable mountain or a
sometimes realistic, if inconsistently applied, alternative for some student loan debtors, is debatable.
Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical Assessment
of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 437 (2005) (finding some relief granted in
more than half of 286 undue hardship decisions); Aaron N. Taylor & Daniel J. Sheffuer, Oh, What a
Relief It (Sometimes) Is: An Analysis of Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petitions to Discharge Student Loans, 27
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loan borrower can obtain an undue hardship discharge, it requires a level of proof,
expense, and outcome risk that would discourage borrowers from attempting to
obtain the discharge.
The 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(BAPCPA) included a provision adding "any other educational loan that is a
qualified education loan" into the same provision requiring that federal student
loans meet the undue hardship test to obtain a discharge in bankruptcy, thus
bringing almost all private student loans within the undue hardship exception. 177
Prior to 2005, private student loan borrowers did not face these barriers to
discharging student loans in bankruptcy. 178

2005...Current

1998-2005
Discharge of
Fedenll.oan
Pre 1976

Waiting Period
for Federal Loan

No Exception m

5 years (to 1990)

Discoorge

Undue Hardship
Extends to
Private Loan

Require• Undue

Hardship

7 years (to 1998)

Figure 3: Bankruptcy Discharge Rights of Student Loan Debtors
Professor John Pottow has analyzed bankruptcy law in multiple nations and
identified six possible rationales for restricting student borrower access to
bankruptcy courts: fraud, soft fraud (opportunism), internalization, shaming, public

STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 295 (2016) (describing the undue hardship exception in bankruptcy for student
loans and providing an empirical analysis rejecting the common perception that discharge is nearly
impossible for student debtors). There is little doubt, however, that court decisions have discouraged
its use. A January 15, 2020 opinion by Judge Cecelia Morris, the Chief Judge of the Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of New York, describes how bankruptcy courts have employed a "certainty
of hopelessness" approach to meeting the undue hardship standard and how this approach has led to
"a quasi-standard of mythic proportions so much so that most people (bankruptcy professionals as well
as lay individuals) believe it impossible to discharge student loans." Rosenberg v. N.Y. State Higher
Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Rosenberg), 610 B.R. 454, 459 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020) (parenthetical in
original). Judge Morris discharged Mr. Rosenberg's debts and stated that "[t]his Court will not
participate in perpetuating these myths" about the undue hardship standard. Id.
177. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCP) of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 220,119 Stat. 23, 59 (codified at 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(8)). "Qualified education loan"
is defined by reference to section 221 (d) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. While not unlimited
in scope as to private student loans, it broadly encompasses the vast majority of private student loans.
See NAT'L CONSUMERL CTR., supra note 140, §§ 11.2.3.4, 11.2.4.
178. Da1ie Jimenez, A Tortuous History: The Student Loan Exception to Discharge (Apr. 10,
2014) (unpublished manuscript), https:/ /papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfin?abstract_id=3544267
[https:/ /perma.cc/8EWP-YSHF].
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fisc, and cost of capital. 179 In imposing the initial waiting period restriction in 1978,
"the articulated purpose of this legislation was to prevent a specific abuse, the filing
of bankruptcy shortly after graduation for the primary purpose of discharging
student loans." 180 This rationale is consistent with Pottow's soft fraud, or
opportunism, justification for harsher treatment of student loans m
bankruptcy-the concern that "students rack up huge educational debts only to
waltz into bankruptcy the day after graduation." 181
Pottow argues that this rationale is not supportable because it makes no
distinction between those using educational debts to become rich with the intent of
never paying back the money and those who obtained no such benefit. 182 One could
argue that the proper response to this situation was the original legislative solution
of a waiting period, not an undue hardship test. Writing in 2007 before the broad
expansion ofIDR, Pottow describes the best response to the soft fraud concern as
tying bankruptcy limits to IDR:
In contrast to the U.S. (and Canadian) mortgage-style regimes, which treat

student debt as a lump-sum outlay that gets capitalized at graduation and
then amortized over fixed-period installment payments, countries such as
Australia and New Zealand (and recently, the United Kingdom) have
embraced an income-contingent model. Repayment of student debt is a
variable endeavor, and a repayment "tithe" is determined by a percentage
of the debtor's income.1s3
Thus, given the broad availability of IDR for federal student loans, one could
argue that restrictions on bankruptcy discharge are justifiable when a student
borrower can make payments scaled to income. 184 But this justification for
imposing the undue burden obstacle has no application to private student loans.
Private student loan borrowers have no access to IDR, with the exception of certain
above-described income-share agreement loans. 185

179. John Pottow, The Nondischargeabi!ity of Student Loans in Persona! Bankruptcy
Proceedings: The Search for a Theory, 44 CANADIAN Bus. L.J. 245 (2007).
180. Janice Koso!, Running the Gauntlet of "Undue Hardship "-The Discharge of Student Loans
in Bankruptcy, 11 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 457,460 (1981). Richard Fossey noted that this conclusion
was reached in the absence of any supporting information, as Congress had "virtually no evidence that
the student borrowers who had filed for bankruptcy were acting in bad faith. No data exited on the
circumstances of the debtors who had discharged their educational loans." Richard Fossey, The
"Certainty of Hopelessness:" Are Courts Too Harsh Toward Bankrupt Student Loan Debtors?, 26
J.L. & EDUC. 29, 34 (1997). In fact, a contemporaneous empirical study on the subject suggested little
support for the argument that student borrowers abused bankruptcy. HR. REP. NO. 95-595, at 161
(1977) (finding less than one percent discharge rate on student loans).
181. Pottow, supra note 179, at 266.
182. Id. at 266-67.
183. Id. at 267.
184. To be clear, we are not making the argument that the undue hardship exception is proper
given IDR, but rather that IDR is a counterbalancing benefit that reasonably could be argued justifies
imposing the undue burden restriction.
185. Supra Section I.C.1.b.
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Furthermore, reliance on IDR is particularly important and appropriate
because the federal government does not underwrite or restrict access to federal
student loans. Student have a right to obtain federal student loans, and the federal
government does not engage in ex ante underwriting of the student's likely ability
to repay. A student with a C average in high school majoring in performance art
with substantial credit card debt has as much right to a federal student loan as the
high school A student in a nursing program with no other debt.
Not so with private lenders. Borrowers do not have a right to private student
loans and also unlike federal government student lending, private lenders regularly
conduct an ability-to-repay analysis prior to origination. As noted previously, private
lenders overwhelmingly require cosigners for whom the ability-to-repay analysis is
more meaningful. Accordingly, there is no more reason to absolve private student
loan lenders of the consequence of their underwriting failure than there would be
for any other type of creditor.
Nor is there any more reason to apply the cost of capital explanation to private
student loans than other types of underwritten, unsecured debt. In any case, the
argument for this rationale has been empirically disproven by Alexei Alexandrov
and Dalie Jimenez, who establish that the 2005 BAPCPA change
did not result in low credit-score students at four-year undergraduate
institutions paying less for PSLs, despite the fact that these loans were now
presumptively nondischargeable. Second, we find no evidence that college
students are sensitive to price, so that even if lenders had passed on the
savings from BAPCPA in the form oflower prices, it likely would not have
caused an increase in the number of students who took up loans. 186
Some courts have suggested that the undue hardship test also is supported by
the public fisc rationale-a desire to protect taxpayers. The Seventh Circuit
articulated this position in In re &berson as follows: "The government is not twisting
the arms of potential students .... If the leveraged investment of an education does
not generate the return the borrower anticipated, the student, not the taxpayers,
must accept the consequences of the decision to borrow." 187 The Eleventh Circuit
cited &berson in similarly adopting the public fisc justification. 188
Again, this rationale has no application to private student loans, which do not
use taxpayer money. With neither public money at issue nor a range of repayment
and discharge options available, many of the reasons that could justify application

186. Alexei Alexandrov & Dahe Jimenez, Lessons from Bankruptcy Reform in the Private Student
Loan Market, 11 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 175, 208 (2017).
187. In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1137 (7th Cir. 1993).
188. In re Cox, 338 F.3d 1238, 1242 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Roberson and adding that
"Congress's intent to make it harder for a student to shift his debt responsibility onto the taxpayer is
clear from the 1998 amendments").
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of the undue hardship test have no purchase when considering private
student loans. 189
Discerning the possible rationales actually considered by Congress when it
swept away generally available bankruptcy protection for private student loan
borrowers is difficult because there is essentially no legislative history for this part
ofBAPCPA. The House Committee Report on BAPCPA referred to the expansion
of the undue hardship to private student loans only by more or less repeating the
text of the bill.1 90 This absence of a legislative record is remarkable given the
implications for the enormous private student loan market and the millions of
private student loan borrowers. Even amongst the many dissenting opinions to the
bill in general, no congressperson raised a concern over the changes to
student loans. 191
Whatever the motives for the BAPCPA amendments, 192 private student loan
borrowers now face the same restrictions in bankruptcy as borrowers with federal
student loans. Cosigners on student loans-a situation much more likely to occur
with private student loans-likely also are subject to proof of undue hardship when
seeking a discharge of the debt in bankruptcy. 193
Parts II and III of this Article propose solutions that provide balance to this
stripping of bankruptcy rights from private student loan borrowers. Part II looks at
prospective state legislation that would incorporate some of the protections given
to federal student loan borrowers into private loans used for-profit school
attendance. Part III looks at state legislation that would limit the use of courts to
collect private loans from former for-profit school students.

189. See also Rebekah Keller, Note, The "Undue Hardship" Test: The Dangers of a Subjective Test
in Determining the Dischargeability of Student Loan Debt in Bankruptcy, 82 Mo. L. REV. 211,235 (2017)
(arguing that "[~ederal student loans should remain non-dischargeable in bankruptcy because of their
status as public debts, because they fall within the category of government resources, and because the
U.S. Department of Education has created many alternative ways for borrowers to repay their loans,"
but that private loans should be dischargeable).
190. The only reference to the imposition of undue hardship exception for private student loans
was as follows: "Sec. 220. Nondischargeability of Certain Educational Benefits and Loans. Section 220 of
the Act amends section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code to provide that a debt for a qualified
education loan (as defined in section 221 (e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code) is nondischargeable,
unless excepting such debt from discharge would impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the
debtor's dependents." H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 62 (2005).
191. Rafael I. Pardo, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83
AM. BANKR. L.J. 179, 181 (2009) (noting that the undue hardship exception "did not meet with any
objections from lawmakers, even from the House members who expressed dissenting views to
accompany the House Judiciary Committee's report on the 2005 amendments"); Preston Mueller, The
N ondischargeability of Private Stu dent Loans: A Looming Financial Crisis?, 32 EMORY
BANKR. DEVS. J. 230, 234-35 (2015).
192. Pardo suggests the motive for the change may be simple: "The history of the Bankruptcy
Code's student-loan discharge provision further bolsters the conclusion that Congress has been
capitulating to the lender lobby." Pardo, supra note 191, at 180.
193. Cf Mueller, supra note 191, at 252.
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II. PROPOSAL ONE: PRIVATE STUDENT BORROWER PROTECTION ACT
In this Part, we describe model state legislation to prospectively create rights
for private student loan borrowers attending for-profit schools. The proposed
Private Student Borrower Protection Act (PSBPA) relies on the concepts underlying
the FTC Holder Rule, which is described in Section II.A. The following two sections
identify the loans subject to the requirements of the law, and the protections
available under federal student loan law that are incorporated into the PSBPA. The
final section examines the issue of federal preemption, concluding that this type of
state legislation is not subject to HEA preemption but may be susceptible to
National Bank Act preemption for certain lenders. In Appendix A, we offer
suggested language for the model legislation.

A. The FTC Holder Rule
The FTC Holder Rule provides a template for a consumer protection
mechanism appropriate to the task here. Consumer protection law can roughly be
divided into two types. First, consumer protection laws can be based on broad
anti-fraud principles, most commonly in UDAP statutes. Second, consumer
protection laws can incorporate rule-based protections, such as requiring market
actors to take certain actions (e.g., make disclosures, give consumers an extended
right to cancel, or comply with specified dispute procedures) or refrain from certain
actions (e.g., charging interest in excess of certain limits, calling consumers on a
do-not-call list, or threatening to sue debtors when the limitations period on the
debt has expired). 194 The typical means for imposing these requirements is a statute
or regulation that requires or prohibits conduct in identified transactions.
The FTC Holder Rule takes a unique approach to consumer protection that is
appropriate to the situation that the PSBPA seeks to address. The primary
mechanism for protection under the Holder Rule is the required incorporation of
specific language into certain consumer finance contracts. Sellers of financed
transactions, as defined under the rule, are required to insert a two-sentence
provision into the consumer credit contract, which states the following in part: "Any
holder of this consumer credit contract is subject to all claims and defenses which
the debtor could assert against the seller" (the Holder Rule provision). 195 The
enforcement of the protections in the Holder Rule, therefore, essentially is
self-executing through contract law. Under the Holder Rule, the derivative liability
of the contract holder for the conduct of the seller is written into the credit contract.
Indeed, the derivative liability of the contract holder exists by terms of the contract
even when the Holder Rule provision was inserted by mistake; i.e., the contract

194. In other words, the well-known standards versus rule distinction applies well in the field
of consumer protection law. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 55 7 (1992).
195. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (2020).
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included the Holder Rule provision even though the Holder Rule did not apply to
the transaction. 196
Because the Holder Rule relies on contract law for enforcement, rather than
typical statutory enforcement mechanisms, enforcement is problematic when the
seller or original creditor with an obligation to insert the provision fails to comply.
Failure to include the Holder Rule provision may give rise to a UDAP or other claim
against the seller, but that defeats the purpose of creating derivative liability for the
creditor who is more likely to be solvent and to have an incentive to resolve the
claim when presented as a defense to collection. 197 State UDAP laws, state adoption
of certain provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, or other state law can
provide an indirect mechanism for reading the Holder Rule into the credit contract
as an implied term in these circumstances. 198
The Holder Rule only applies when a consumer obtains financing for a
purchase either directly from the seller199 or when the seller refers the consumer for
financing. 200 Referral includes financing through a creditor who has a business
arrangement with the seller, which is broadly defined to include "[a]ny
understanding, procedure, course of dealing, or arrangement, formal or informal"
between the seller and creditor. 20 1
An area in which the Holder Rule provides important protection is private
student loans for for-profit school attendance. The Holder Rule does not apply to
public entities or nonprofits acting as the seller. 202 A student attending a public
university or nonprofit college who obtains a private student loan cannot expect to
see the Holder Rule provision in their loan contract. 203 For students using private
loans to attend a for-profit school, however, the Holder Rule clearly applies and
provides a means for raising the type of defense to repayment that are available to
federal student loan borrowers under the borrower defense rule. 204 This is one of
the few consumer protections on which private student loan borrowers may rely.
The derivative liability imposed in the Holder Rule provides recourse to
consumers that they otherwise would not be able to obtain. It also gives creditors
an incentive to conduct due diligence on the sellers whose purchases it finances.
This market-supervision function is more appropriately placed on a creditor seeking

196. NAT'L CONSUMERL. CTR., FEDERAL DECEPTION LAW§ 4.2.1 (3d ed. 2017).
197. Id.§ 4.4.1.
198. Id.
199. The Holder Rule incorporates the Truth in Lending Act definition of a "credit sale" within
the scope of covered transactions. 16 C.F.R. § 433.l(e) (2020).
200. The Holder Rule incorporates the Truth in Lending Act definition of a "[p]urchase money
loan" as part of defining the scope of covered transactions. Id. § 433.1 (d).
201. Id. § 433.1 (g).
202. But when a public entity or nonprofit is the creditor in a transaction in which the seller is
covered under the Holder Rule, the credit contract may need to include the Holder Rule provision. See
NAT'L CONSUMERL. CTR., supra note 196, § 4.2.2.6.
203. Id.
204. Id.; NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 140, § 10.6.
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to benefit from a regular flow ofloan origination from a for-profit school than it is
on a single student of such a school. As the FTC stated in promulgating the rule,
Consumers are not in a position to police the market, exert leverage over
sellers, or vindicate their legal rights in cases of clear abuse. The sheer
expense of obtaining an accurate assessment of the likelihood of seller
misconduct in a particular case are prohibitive .... [Under the Holder
Rule], [c]reditors will simply not accept the risks generated by the truly
unscrupulous merchant. The market will be policed in this fashion and all
parties will benefit accordingly. 205
As described below, the Holder Rule's unique consumer protection
mechanism and its market regulating function are well suited to accomplish the
pw.pose of the PSBPA.

B. Loans and Borrowers Within Scope of the Act
This Section describes the scope of the PSBPA-which loans and which
borrowers to which it applies. 206 It also fleshes out the analogy to the Holder Rule
by comparing the scope of the regulatory schemes.

1. Student Loans by a Nonpublic Lender for Attendance at For-Profit Schools
The PSBPA applies to private student loans for attendance at a for-profit
school. Each of these scope provisions is discussed below.
The guiding concept of the Act is to provide the rights of federal student loan
borrowers to private student loan borrowers in order to counterbalance the undue
hardship obstacle to bankruptcy protection. The Act, therefore, incorporates the
definition of "qualified education loans" used in the Bankruptcy Code to include
private student loans within the undue hardship exception, which is a term
incorporated by reference from the Internal Revenue Code. 207 The Act then
expressly excludes government student loans-again using the Bankruptcy Code
definition-because "qualified education loans" could otherwise encompass such
loans. 208 In addition to excluding federal student loans, this provision also would
mean that loans by state government entities would not be covered by PSBPA

205. Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule Concerning the Preservation of
Consumer Claims and Defenses, 40 Fed. Reg. 53523 (Nov. 18, 1975).
206. The PSBPA scope provisions incorporate by reference terms of federal law in numerous
instances. Each state considering adoption of the PSBPA should evaluate the particular meaning of
such an incorporation by reference under that state's law. See generally F. Scott Boyd, Looking Glass
Law: Legislation by Reference in the States, 68 LA. L. REV. 1201 (2008) (tracing the development of the
statutory-incorporation-by-reference doctrine, the types of statutory references, courts' expansionist
interpretation of the doctrine, and the interaction between the doctrine and the
non-delegation doctrine).
207. 26 U.S.C. § 221(d) (incorporated by reference in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B)).
208. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B).
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protections. 209 If an arguably private student loan is not defined as such under these
terms, it should also not be subject to the bankruptcy undue hardship exception,
and thus there is not the need for a ballast of compensating borrowerprotections. 210
The PSBPA does not exclude from its scope all nonprofit lenders: a group of
lenders covered by the undue hardship exception language. 211 Including nonprofit
lenders is consistent with providing protections to student borrowers who lack
ready access to bankruptcy discharge and lack access to federal student loan
protections. 212 An exception to this inclusion of nonprofit lenders is that the
PSBPA excludes from its scope nonprofit lenders with government affiliation, for
the same reasons that loans by state entities are excluded. 213
The Act incoiporates the HEA definition of for-profit schools, deemed
"proprietary institutions of higher education" in the HEA. 214 This definition
expressly excludes public and nonprofit institutions. 215 The Act focuses on private
loans to for-profit school students because the nexus of private loans and for-profit
schools has been an area of repeated abuse. The problems with for-profit schools,
including the targeting of veterans and minorities, has ebbed and flowed for
decades, at least since World War II. 216 Protecting for-profit students from abusive
private loans is a long-term problem that has needed, and likely will continue to
need, a long-term public policy solution.

209. Some state governments operate loan programs. See, e.g., About SELF Loans,
MINN. OFF. HIGHER EDUC., http:/ /www.selfloan.state.mn.us/index.cfm [https:/ /perma.cc/VC2ATLVS] (last visited Sept. 27, 2020) (describing the SELF loan programs as "a long-term, low-interest
student loan ... administered by the Minnesota Office of Higher Education, a state agency" and stating
that "the interest rates may be lower than private loans and some federal loans"); Andrew Wold,
Alt-Remedies to Paying Student Loans: In Some Cases, Relief Is Available, 76 BENCH & BAR MINN. 27,
29 (2019) (describing SELF program).
210. For a discussion of the narrow universe of loans that may not be covered by the undue
hardship exception, see NAT'L CONSUMERL. CTR., supra note 140, §§ 11.2.3.1, .3.
211. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A)(i).
212. Including nonprofit lenders also would help prevent the covert use of a nonprofit by a
for-profit institution. See infra notes 215-17 and accompanying text. One could imagine a for-profit
institution establishing a nonprofit lender to make loans to attend a for-profit school and thus claiming
these loans were excluded from coverage by the PSBP A. The Act also does not exclude the reference
to "an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend" in 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii). This odd category of repayment obligations would fall within the scope of the
PSBPA, but only if the other scope provisions apply.
213. The 2019 GAO Report described this group oflenders as follows: "Nonbank state lenders
provide private student loans to residents of their states and out-of-state students attending in-state
schools. These lenders are mission-driven entities focused on increasing college access and affordability
in their states, among other things, and are funded through tax-advantaged bond funding."
GAO-19-430, supra note 16, at 3 n.7.
214. 20 U.S.C. § 1002(b). For a history of the derivation of this term under the HEA, see Ass'n
of Proprietary Coils. v. Duncan, 107 F. Supp. 3d 332, 341-42 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
215. A "proprietary'' institution is one that "does not meet the requirement of paragraph (4) of
section 1001(a) of this title," 20 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(1)(C), which "is a public or other nonprofit
institution," 20 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(4).
216. Supra Section I.B.
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Nonprofit schools are excluded along with public institutions in the proposed
scope provisions of the PSBPA. A concern with this exclusion is that there is a
growing problem of for-profits covertly using nonprofits to circumvent consumer
protections. For-profit school owners establish a nonprofit that they control,
effectively negating the nonprofit purpose. Lack of effective Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) control makes the problem difficult to remedy. 217 As Robert Shireman
has noted, "of all schools claiming nonprofit status for at least five years, the three
with the most fraud complaints [by student borrowers] are covert
for-profits-conversions in which power never actual shifted away from owners
who have an ongoing financial interest." 218
Accordingly, the PSBPA includes a provision including within the scope of
the Act a nonprofit substantially operated or controlled by a for-profit institution.
Ultimately, the problem of covert nonprofits is an enforcement issue for the IRS
and state authorities. A law enacted in Maryland in 2019 and legislation pending in
California provide models for increased enforcement to address this problem. 219

2. In-State Students of Online Schools Covered
States clearly have an interest in protecting students when loans are originated
for physical attendance at a school located in the state. Yet a focus on for-profit
schools also necessitates attention to the online learning space. The PSBPA covers
students attending schools with a physical presence in the state and students who
reside in the state while obtaining a private loan to attend an online school without
a physical presence in the state.
The number of students completing online-only education has increased over
time, unsurprisingly. The percentage of total undergraduate enrollment with classes
solely through online learning rose from 3.8% in 2007-2008 to 6.5% in 2011-2012
to 10.8% in 2015-2016. 22 For-profit schools are disproportionately enrolling these
students, especially out-of-state online students. As shown in Table 1, for-profit
schools enrolled only about 5.5% (1.09 million) of the total higher education

°

217. Robert Shireman, These Colleges Say They're Nonprofit-But Are They?, CENTURY
FOUND. (Aug. 24, 2018), https:/ /tcf.org/content/commentary/colleges-say-theyre-nonprofit
[https:/ /perma.cc/5Z28-8J8U]; Brian Galle, Conversions of For-Profit to Nonprofit Colleges Deserve
Regulators' Scrutiny,
MEDIUM
(Apr. 3, 2018),
https:/ /medium.com/whatever-sourcederived/ conversions-of-for-profit-to-nonprofit-colleges-deserve-re gulators-s crutiny-1b9174cf534d
[https:/ /perma.cc/TND7-PCUC]; see also Marguerite Mills, Privatization of Public Education: Balancing
Students and the Bottom Line, 6 EMORY CORP. GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 1091 (2019),
https: //law. emory.edu/ ecgar/ perspectives/ volume-6 /perspectives/ privatization-pubhc-educationstudents-bottom-hne.h tml [https://perma.cc/M8SP-SGHR] (describing the case of Purdue Global).
218. Shireman, supra note 217.
219. Mo. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 10-101 (West 2019); Assemb. B. 1341, 2019-2020 Leg.,
Reg.
Sess.
(Cal.
2019), https:/ /leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextChent.xhtml?bill_id=
201920200AB1341 [https:/ /perma.cc/D6NW-SSFD].
220. Digest of Education Statistics: Table 311.22, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT.,
https:/ /nces.ed.gov /programs/ digest/ d18/ tables/ dt18_311.22.asp [https:/ /perma.cc/N2JU-3RYV]
(last visited Sept. 27, 2020).
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enrollment of 19.76 million students in 2017, but they enrolled about 21% (.657
million) of the 3.1 million online-only students. 221 Approximately sixty percent of
for-profit school students are online-only, or more than three times the percentage
of online-only students compared to private nonprofit institutions and more than
five times the percentage of online-only students compared to public institutions. 222
These for-profit online students draw from a broad geographic area. While
approximately eighty-four percent of online-only students at public institutions
were in-student residents, only approximately sixteen percent of for-profit
online-only students were in-student residents. 223
% Total
Total
Online-Only
Enrollment
Enrollment
Classes
Online-Only
Public

14,560,155

1,657,185

11.4%

Private Nonprofit

4,106,477

788,407

19.2%

1,098,966
657,908
59.9%
Table 1: Online-Only Enrollment by Type oflnstitution, 2017 224

Private For-Profit

Schools that are predominantly online-only-meaning more than ninety
percent of their students are exclusively online-are dominated by for-profit
institutions. 225 Of the 103 higher education institutions that fit this definition,
approximately sixty-five percent are for-profit. 226
Regulation of online higher education is a bit of a mess. A key difficulty in this
area has been determining how authorization of a higher education institution
should occur when the program offered is online. States are an integral part of the
authorization system, but the ED also has a critical role, including determining
which online students are eligible for federal student loans based on the various
state authorizations. 227 The vast majority of states, with the notable exception of
221. Digest of Educational Statistics: Table 311.15, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT.,
https:/ /nces.ed.gov /programs/ digest/ d18/ tables/ dt18_311.15.asp [https:/ /perma.cc/8JBW-ZTU4]
(last visited Sept. 27, 2020) (Fall 2017 enrollment).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Digest of Educational Statistics: Table 311.33, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT. n.1,
https:/ /nces.ed.gov /programs/ digest/ d18/ tables/ dt18_311.33.asp [https:/ /perma.cc/Y75N-TVAJ]
(last visited Sept. 27, 2020) (Fall 2017 enrollment).
226. Id. at tbl.311.33.
227. Lindsay McKenzie, Rethinking State Authorization, Again, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 23,
2019), https:/ /www.insidehighered.com/ digital-learning/ article/ 2019/01/23 / education-departmentrevisits-state-authorization-online [https:/ /perma.cc/ERX4-39P7] ("After almost 10 years of
discussion, one thing is clear: state authorization is complex. Few groups agree on exactly how it should
be done, or even if it should be done at all. Yet Education Department officials are optimistic they can
find a way forward that will make the rules simpler for colleges. The test will be whether they can do
so without significantly reducing consumer protections for students."). The HEA includes the notion
of online learning in the term "distance education," 20 U.S.C. § 1003(7), but the relevant provisions of
the HEA do not substantially address how to resolve state authorization concerns.
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California, have entered into some form of the State Authorization Reciprocity
Agreement (SARA), an interstate compact designed to bring continuity to state
authorization of online schools. 228 The Act incoiporates the terminology of SARA
for "physical presence" and "distance education" to effectuate the goal of covering
students who either attend an in-state school or have a primary residence in the state
while attending an online school that does not have a physical presence in
the state. 229

3. The Usefulness of the Holder Rule Analogy
The concept underlying the Holder Rule-that consumer protections are
written into consumer contracts-provides a useful tool for the putpose of the
PSBPA. Most consumer finance protections work by regulating contract formation
or terms of credit that are apparent at the time of origination, 230 such as disclosures
or representations made prior to the execution of the contract, 231 substantive terms
that are fixed at the time of origination, 232 or rights to cancel that arise within days
of the loan origination. 233 The rights of the borrower in these situations can be
determined at or near the time of origination. Accordingly, when borrowers move
to other states after loan origination, the time for effect of the state law protections
has already occurred and an issue of whether the law in the originating state applies
to the loan does not arise, absent preemption by federal law. 234
The protections in the PSBPA, however, often depend on conditions that arise
subsequent to the origination of the student loan, such as disability discharge or the
amount of repayment under IDR, that may occur at a time when the student
borrower lives in another state. Following the logic of the Holder Rule, these
protections would be in the contract terms and thus follow the borrowers to any
other state. This is a particularly useful feature given that students often are mobile
both while they are attending higher education institutions and after they
graduate. 235 Absent use of the Holder Rule concept, questions might also arise as to

228. NC-SARA Institution Directory, NC-SARA, https:/ /www.nc-sara.org/directory
[https://perma.cc/U9Q9-Y48A] (last visited Sept. 27, 2020).
229. NAT'L COUNCIL FOR STATE AUTHORIZATION RECIPROCITY AGREEMENTS, SARA
MANUAL 40-42 (version 20.1 2020).
230. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM'N 2020) (stating that courts may
refuse to enforce unconscionable contracts).
231. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 164 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (discussing
what misrepresentations make a contract voidable); supra text accompanying notes 168, 169, 171.
232. See, eg., CAL. CONST. art. XV,§ 1 (setting usury limits for certain loans).
233. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (setting out a three-day cancellation period for home equity
loans or lines of credit).
234. See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine
and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 521 (2004) (describing the use of
the "exportation doctrine" to preempt state regulation of consumer finance contracts initiated by a
national bank).
235. DOUG SHAPIRO, AFET DUNDAR, FAYE HUIE, PHOEBE KHASIALA WAKHUNGU,
AYESHA BHIMDIWALA, ANGEL NATHAN & YOUNGSIKHWANG, NAT'L STUDENT CLEARINGHOUSE
RsCH. CTR., SIGNATURE REP. 15: TRANSFER AND MOBILITY: A NATIONAL VIEW OF STUDENT
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whether a borrower with private student loans from a for-profit school who moves
after graduation from a state with no PSBPA to a state with PSBPA protections
would be afforded those protections. Under the PSBPA use of the Holder Rule,
lenders would not have been obligated to insert protections into the loan contracts
and such borrowers would not be covered under the protections of the Act.
The market-regulating function of the Holder Rule also is helpful in the
context of borrowing by for-profit school students. When lenders have to accept
certain risks attributable to the conduct and usefulness of the for-profit school's
educational program, underwriting will mean evaluating each for-profit school to
determine the likelihood that it will close or other school-related discharge rights,
and the likelihood that the school's graduate will earn enough to pay back the loan
under an IDR formula.
One limitation of the Holder Rule is that it lacks an explicit enforcement
mechanism when sellers and lenders within the scope of the rule fail to include the
required provision in the consumer contract. 236 This is a particular problem for the
Holder Rule because the FTC Act lacks a private right of action. The PSBPA
resolves this problem by including a provision that any contract within the scope of
the Act that fails to include the required contract terms shall be deemed to have
incoiporated those terms in the contract and the lender shall be deemed to have
violated the state UDAP law, thus providing for a fee-shifting private right of action
in almost every state. 237
C. Federal Student Loan Protections Incorporated in the PSEPA
We earlier identified four categories of protections afforded to federal student
loan borrowers-repayment rights, disability discharge, school-related discharge,
and public service discharge. 238 The putpose of the PSBPA is to balance the
existence of obstacles to bankruptcy with state law protections analogous to the
protections afforded to federal student loan borrowers. In this Section, we identify
which of the federal student loan protections achieve this objective while not unduly
impeding the access to private student loans for for-profit students. We also note
which of the protections can be managed with due diligence on the part of the
lender and thus are consistent with the market-regulating function of the Holder

MOVEMENT IN POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTIONS, FALL 2011 COHORT 20-21 (2018) ("Nearly half of
students who started at four-year private nonprofit institutions and for-profit institutions transferred
out-of-state .... "); NAT'L STUDENT CLEARINGHOUSE RsCH. CTR., SNAPSHOT REPORT: INTERSTATE
MOBILITY
(2012),
https: / / nscresearchcenter.org/ wp-content/ uploads/ SnapshotReport5InterstateMobility.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/2G9C-QXQC] ("On average, 15.1 percent of all
U.S. postsecondary students who received undergraduate degrees in 2010-11 had previously attended
college in at least one other state or territory.").
236. See supra text accompanying notes 197-198.
237. Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Chaplin, Does Fraud Pay? An Empirical Analysis of
Attorney's Fees Provisions in Consumer Fraud Statutes, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 483, 518-24 app. (2008)
(providing a list of state fee-shifting provisions with private UDAP enforcement).
238. Supra Section LC. 1.a.
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Rule. The PSBPA adopts a form of IDR tied to federal IDR payments and
incoiporates federal disability and school-related discharge protections but does not
require private loans to offer public service discharge.
1. IDR Rights

The most important of the safeguards afforded to federal student loan
borrowers are repayment rights, and the most important repayment right across the
totality of borrower circumstances is IDR. As noted by Professor Pottow, IDR that
allows calibration of repayment to income is the only reasonable justification of a
bankruptcy discharge exception for student loans. 239 The PSBPA incoiporates IDR
by linking private loan repayment to federal student loan repayment when all of a
borrower's federal student loan repayments are made through IDR, as follows:
* Private loan monthly repayment amounts are limited to thirty percent of the
federal loan IDR payment made by the borrower who attended the higher education
institution, without regard to income of co borrowers. The thirty percent amount is
calculated without regard to prepayment of the federal loans to obviate the risk to
the lender of the student borrower prepaying only the federal student loan for
putposes of effectively discharging the private student loan.
* The private lender with the oldest originated loan obtains the full benefit of
the limited IDR payment, with any remaining eligible payment allocated to private
lenders in order ofloan origination.
* Once the borrower has made all required federal IDR payments for the full
number of years, typically twenty years, no future payments would be due on the
private loan and the loan would be considered fully repaid.
* If the borrower did not obtain any federal student loans for attendance at
the school receiving the benefits of the loan proceeds, then the lender would be
required to offer any borrower in default the option of a loan modification limiting
future payments to the same terms as the PAYE IDR program.
* If the student borrower elects not to repay federal loans through IDR, then
the private loan payments would not be eligible for IDR, which is consistent with
the putpose of the PSBPA to incoiporate federal student loan protections.
This approach allows a simple benchmark method of determining IDR
payments. Creating parallel outcomes for the federal and private student loans
makes sense because the rationale for incoiporating these rights in state law is to
provide private student loan borrowers some of the protections available to federal
student loan borrowers. Parallel determination of loan payment amounts also
should be relatively efficient for lenders, as there are a limited number of loan
servicers for student loans, and thus the loan servicer is likely to understand the
requirement of federal student loan repayment and discharge rights. 240

239.
240.

Pottow, supra note 179, at 266-67.
NAT'L CONSUMERL. CTR., supra note 140, § 5.2.1.1.
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The PSBPA allocates access to these thirty percent payments by date of
origination of the private loan. Unlike federal loans, which are all made directly by
the federal government after 2011, there can be multiple private student loan
creditors. This can be true even when the loans were originated by the same entity
because the loans can be sold in the secondary market. \X/hen more than one private
student loan is securitized, it is almost certain that the borrower's loans will be
owned by multiple entities, typically a trust. 241
The PSBPA, therefore, states that the percentage limit tied to federal IDR
payments is the total for all private student loans owed by that borrower and access
to this thirty percent repayment amount is allocated by date of origination. This
gives private lenders an incentive to maintain a higher relative balance of federal to
private student loans and cease lending when the private share of IDR payments
will go to prior in time loans and lenders. It also provides an incentive to for-profit
schools to direct students to federal loan programs when possible. This directly
targets one of the abuses of for-profit school students, which is the use of high-cost
student loans when federal student loans are available. 242

2. Discharge Rights
School-related discharges offer the clearest case for inclusion in the PSBPA.
Allowing such discharge promotes exactly the sort of lender due diligence
supporting the reason for the Holder Rule because the lender is in the best position
to more efficiently determine whether a school engages in practices that would
expose it to such risks. It also is consistent with fairly balancing the lack of
bankruptcy discharge rights if the expected benefits of the loan are not realized
because of school misconduct. For example, the right to discharge a federal student
loan when a school falsely certifies that its program meets relevant state
requirements for employment in the field of training is an archetype of the kind of
problems encountered by for-profit school students. 243 Private student loan
discharge should follow from federal student loan discharge.
The disability discharge protections available to federal student borrowers also
meet the purposes of the PSBPA. A person with a total and permanent disability
and resulting lack of income would typically be eligible for a simple bankruptcy
discharge of a private student loan absent the undue hardship provision. Requiring
this protection through state law directly compensates for the loss of
bankruptcy rights.
The public service discharge, however, is not a right incorporated into the
PSBPA. These programs use loan forgiveness by the federal government to
incentivize and reward public service. This laudable goal reduces the burden ofloan

241. See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 133, at 13-15 (describing analogous mortgage servicing
process resulting in ownership of a loan by a trust or other single-purpose vehicle).
242. Supra note 40 and accompanying text.
243. See, e,g., Vasquez, supra note 100.
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repayment primarily for a reason unrelated to making federal student loan
repayment proportionate to ability to repay. Nor is this type of discharge consistent
with the Holder Rule function of shifting due diligence to the lender.
Similar to IDR rights, the PSBPA uses the exercise of the federal right to loan
discharge as a proxy for the availability of the right as to the private student loan if
the PSBPA incoiporates that right. If the federal student loan has been discharged,
the private student loan is similarly discharged if that federal discharge right is
incoiporated in the contract through the PSBPA. 244 If the federal student loan is in
forbearance or deferment pending a decision on the availability of the discharge,
then the same status applies to the private student loan if the borrower's application
was made in good faith. Similarly, if the federal right requires a substantive
determination, the PSBPA states that a determination by the ED shall control as to
any right conferred under the contract provisions required to be included by
the PSBPA.

D. Preemption
States can legislate the terms and conditions of private student loans without
concern for preemption under the HEA. 245 Loans made by a national bank,
however, raise preemption concerns under the National Bank Act (NBA).
The Dodd-Frank Act changed the terms of NBA preemption by explicitly
adopting the Barnett Bank decision to determine when a "[s]tate consumer financial
law prevents or significantly interferes with" the activities of a national bank. 246 An
examination of NBA preemption is beyond the scope of this Article, but it seems
possible that national bank lenders would not have to comply with the terms of the
PSBPA. A state considering adopting the PSBPA should consider adding a
provision exempting compliance for loans originated by a national bank.
Even if national banks are free to ignore the requirements of the PSBPA under
NBA preemption, the PSBPA would provide a powerful tool to provide some
protections to this forgotten segment of for-profit school students with private
loans. First, while private student loans mostly are made by national banks, that is
not the case with private loans to for-profit school students. The financial crisis
curtailed private student lending, but bank funding of for-profit schools was
particularly impacted. As the CFPB reported in its 2012 study of private school
loans, "[w]hen bank-funded private student loans became unavailable to students at

244. If there is a partial discharge on federal loan for a borrower defense, then a proportionate
percentage should be given for the private loan.
245. State law authority over private student loans applies even when the same laws might be
preempted in some cases as to federal student loans. See NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., supra note 140,
§ 14.2.4.2 (observing that HEA "preemption of state debt collection claims is not an issue for private
student loans, but it may be for federal student loans."); id.§ 14.3.4 ("Suits against servicers of private
student loans cannot claim HEA preemption, even if the same servicer services federal student loans.");
id. § 14.5.2.4.5 ("Private student loans are not regulated by the HEA so there is no HEA preemption
of state law claims against private student loan lenders.")
246. 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B).
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for-profit schools, some proprietary programs began lending directly to their
students in response." 247 NBA preemption would not be relevant to proprietary
school self-funding or other non-bank funding methods.
Second, there are limits to the reach of national bank lending here. Not all
loans that are nominally made by a national bank fall under NBA preemption. In
particular, "rent-a-bank" arrangements have been found to invalidate application of
NBA preemption. 248 This type of scheme has occurred with private student loans.
Navient, for example, was alleged to have used Stillwater National Bank as a front
for their loans, and thus NBA preemption might not have applied to such loans. 249
Third, even if the impact of the PSBPA is to shift more private for-profit
school lending to national banks, such a move would at least bring a percentage of
private lending from the shadow banking sector into the bank supervision system.
To the extent that certain for-profit school practices can be exposed as unfair or
deceptive, and thus introducing risk, federal banking regulators could be pressured
to place general limits on the associated lending practices, as occurred following the
financial crisis.zso

III. PROPOSAL Two: PRIVATE STUDENT LOAN MEDIATION ACT
Our second proposal, the Private Student Loan Mediation Act (PSLMA)
would provide resources to the growing number of private student loan borrowers
currently in default. This model state legislation would require mediation on
defaulted private student loans before initiating legal proceedings. This concept is
modeled after the mandatory mediation programs that were implemented in
response to the foreclosure crisis. The following sections look at the recommended
features of a private student loan mediation program. In Appendix B, we provide
suggested language for the model legislation.

A. Usefulness of the Foreclosure Mediation Analogy
There are many parallels to mortgage servicing problems experienced by
homeowners leading up to and during the financial crisis and the looming student
loan debt crisis. During the financial crisis, millions of American families faced

247. PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS, supra note 7, at 33.
248. See Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1, 105-06 (2002) (describing the rent-a-bank scheme with payday lending); Consumer
Fin. Prot. Bureau v. CashCall, Inc., No. CV157522JFW(RAOx), 2016 WL 4820635 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31,
2016) (rejecting NBA preemption in rent-a-bank circumstance).
249. Ubaldi v. SLM Corp., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
250. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 3.2 (2020) (setting out the definitions of the risk-based capital
frameworks from Basel III). Perhaps for-profit schools that have been exposed for unfair and deceptive
practices could incur a higher risk-weight in the risk-based capital framework, which might force banks
to hold less of these loans and could encourage banks to monitor for-profit schools. See generally
RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL,JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 215-32 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 5th ed. 2013) (describing the application of the risk-based
capital framework from Basel III).
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foreclosure. In a comment to the CFPB, the Connecticut Department of Banking
noted the parallels between problems with student loans and government response
during the mortgage crisis-"this is not deja vu. We have been here before." 251 As
such, "senior government officials, federal regulators, state law enforcement
agencies, consumer advocates, and others have suggested that the steps taken by
policymakers to strengthen servicing protections for homeowners may offer an
instructive analogy for policymakers and market participants with regard to the
student loan servicing market."252
One of the most effective of measures to address the mortgage crisis was the
use of mandatory preforeclosure mediation. An analysis of the state and local
negotiated foreclosure alternatives adopted between 2008 and 2014 "uniformly
supports the effectiveness of foreclosure mediation in achieving loan modifications
and other resolutions that avoid the need for foreclosure sales." 253 Mediation could
be effective with private student loan default because it addresses the failures of
servicers to effectively inform borrowers of repayment options and because it
changes the dynamics of debt negotiation.
Private student loan borrowers often cannot access existing repayment
options that private lenders may be willing to offer the borrower. As extensively
described above, private student loans do not offer the same repayment plan and
discharge options as federal student loan borrowers. Nonetheless, "a number of
large private student lenders have developed alternative repayment options that take
into account borrowers' financial circumstances." 254 In fact, the five banks with the

251. Request for
Information
on Student Loan Servicing, REGULATIONS.GOV,
https:/ /www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=50&so=DESC&sb=postedDate&po=O&s=CFPB
-2015-0021-0381&dct=PS&D=CFPB-2015-0021 [https:/ /perma.cc/8UG4-JCB2] (last visited
Sept. 27, 2020).
252. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STUDENT LOAN SERVICING: ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC
INPUT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 13 (2015) [hereinafter STUDENT LOAN SERVICING],
https:/ /files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201509_cfj:,b_student-loan-servicing-report.pdf
[https:/ /
perma.cc/V9VU-C4SA] (citing Press Release, Ted Mitchell, Under Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Remarks
at the Federal Student Aid (FSA) Servicing Summit in Atlanta, GA (Dec. 1, 2014),
http://www.ed.gov/ news/ speeches/ prepared-remarks-us-under-secretary-education-ted-mitchellfederal-student-aid-fsa-servicing-summit-atlanta-ga [https:/ /perma.cc/Q33J-L8KD]); Press Release,
Sarah Bloom Raskin, Deputy Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Remarks on Student Loans at the
National Consumer Law Center's Annual Consumer Rights Litigation Conference (Nov. 6, 2014),
https:/ /www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/JL2689.aspx [https:/ /perma.cc/ZY9VEC7N]; The U.S. Economic and Fiscal Outlook: Hearing Before the Joint Econ. Comm., 113th
Cong. (2014) (testimony of Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System),
https: / / www.jec.senate.gov/ public/ index.cfin/hearings-calendar?ID =4 394 D B09-A2E8-4098-9 5EF39 F0B7E8C75B [https:/ /perma.cc/RN9K-TXM3]; Letter from Lisa Madigan, Att'y Gen., Ill. Off. of
the Att'y Gen., to Arne Duncan, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Educ. (June 1, 2015),
http:/ /www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2015_06/ ArneDuncanLetter.pdf
[https:/ /
perma.cc/Q7DJ-NK4P].
253. Alan M. White, Foreclosure Mediation: An Experiment that Worked 7 (Jan. 29, 2016)
(unpublished manuscript), https:/ / ssrn.com/ abstract=2724732 [https:/ /perma.cc/ZC48-C6GT].
254. STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 252, at 21; see also, Letter from Navient, to Monica
Jackson, Off. of the Exec. Sec'y, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (July 13, 2015),
https://www.regulations.gov/ document?D=CFPB-2015-0021-0355
[https:/ /perma.cc/JG6E-
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largest private student loan portfolios offer alternative payment programs. 255 Yet
many borrowers have no idea these options are available to them because the
process for applying for these options are unclear and the eligibility criteria is not
publicly available. 256 And the National Consumer Law Center concludes that
"IP ]rivate loan lenders and loan holders rarely offer reasonable settlements." 257
Which is, in part, because none of the five banks with the largest private student
loan portfolios offer alternative payment programs after default believing them to
be unnecessary because of the availability of alternative payment before default. 258
As with the mortgage crisis, loan servicers are an obstacle to mutually
beneficial loan modifications. Borrowers are often unable to obtain even basic
information about alternative repayment plans. 259 Often this information is not
advertised on servicers' websites or "included in [the] borrowers' promissory notes
or loan contracts." 260 Borrowers express frustration about the process for obtaining
a decision, including customer service representatives being "unable to identify
appropriate personnel who can make a determination about repayment options"
and refusing to provide information about why a repayment plan option was
denied. 261 Even though federal agencies and financial institutions deployed
mortgage loss mitigation initiatives designed to help borrowers avoid foreclosure,
the mortgage servicing practices significantly hindered the efficacy of
these measures. 262
We know from the recent foreclosure crisis that servicer incentives do not
align with either the loan investors' needs and interests or the borrowers' needs and

WNZC]; Letter from James L. Preston, Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, to Monica Jackson,
Off.
of
the
Exec.
Sec'y,
Consumer
Fin.
Prot.
Bureau
(July
9,
2015),
https://www.regulations.gov/ document?D=CFPB-2015-0021-0974
[https:/ /perma.cc/XJM4SXRK]. As the Bureau has noted in other publications, there remain questions about the scale of these
programs. For further discussion of alternative repayment programs and private student loans, see
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CFPB STUDENT LOAN OMBUDSMAN
18-32 (2015). See also Kevin Wack, Wells Fargo, Discover to Start Modifications of Student Loans,
AM. BANKER (Nov. 20, 2014, 5:15 P:M), https:/ /www.americanbanker.com/news/wells-fargodiscover-to-start-modifications-of-student-loans [https:/ /perma.cc/7YNT-TXW2].
255. GA0-19-430, supra note 16, at 11.
256. STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 252, at 25-31.
257. NAT'L CONSUMERL CTR., supra note 140, § 12.7.3
258. The reasons given for not offering rehabilitation programs include low delinquency and
default rates, availability of pre-default payment programs, operational uncertainties, reduced borrower
incentives to avoid default, and risk of compliance violations. GA0-19-430, supra note 16, at 11-12.
259. STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 252, at 25 ("Comments from individual student
loan borrowers and organizations representing public service workers note that servicers of both private
and federal student loans may not inform borrowers experiencing financial hardship about available
alternative repayment plans.").
260. Id. at 27.
261. Id. at 70.
262. Id. at 12; Problems in Mortgage S ervicingfrom Modification to Foreclosure: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urb. Ajfs., 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Thomas J. Miller,
Iowa Att'y Gen.).
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interests. 263 We also learned from the foreclosure crisis that mediation can help both
borrowers and lenders resolve this problem.
An analysis by Alan M. White of the empirical research and data measuring
the effectiveness of foreclosure mediation found that mediation significantly
increases the likelihood of better outcomes. 264 Mediation can also increase
participation rates and rates of successful negotiations. 265 The better outcomes are
not limited to just within the mediation itself but can have a lasting effect on
subsequent redefault rates.266
Some of the success from mediation may be the result of simply monitoring
the loan servicing industry. A study by J. Michael Collins and Carly Urban looked
at the impact of Maryland's emergency servicer reporting requirement (ESRR)
policy which was implemented before federal loss mitigation programs, such as the
federal Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), were launched. 267 The
ESSR policy simply required mortgage servicers to report on the effort to help
homeowners facing foreclosure without any requirement to offer a specific loss
mitigation option or sanctions from noncompliance. 268 Prior to the implementation
of the ESRR, mortgage loan servicers, much like student loan servicers, adopted a
"do nothing" strategy while "facing opaque information about a borrower" which
creates a "status quo bias." 269 The study found that "[s]upervision changes this
dynamic, making modifications and foreclosures the primary alternatives and
leaving doing nothing as an inferior option." 270

B. Utilization of Student Loan Mediation by Bankruptcy Courts
Two bankruptcy court districts, Middle District of Florida and Southern
District of New York, have already implemented mediation programs to help deal
with the mounting student debt crisis. 271 The programs' designs are based upon

263. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 133.
264. Alan M. White, Foreclosure Diversion and Mediation in the States, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 411,
450 (2017).
265. Id. at 420 n.59.
266. Id. at 423. This conclusion is based upon a study by J. Michael Collins and Carly Urban of
three Florida judicial districts. See J. Michael Collins & Carly Urban, Mandatory Mediation and the
Renegotiation of Mortgage Contracts, 125 ECON. J. 1734, 1739-40 (2015).
267. J. Michael Collins & Carly Urban, The Dark Side of Sunshine: Regulatory Oversight and
Status Quo Bias, 107 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 470 (2014).
268. 35 Md. Reg. 1183 (June 20, 2008).
269. Collins & Urban, supra note 267, at 473; see also Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch
& Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5
J. ECON. PERSPS. 193 (1991); William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision
Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988).
270. Collins & Urban, supra note 267, at 473.
271. The Student Loan Management Program for the Middle District of Florida became
effective in October 1, 2019. See Third Amended Administrative Order Prescribing Procedures for
Student Loan Management Program (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2019) (Administrative Order
FLMB-2019-5). The Student Loan Mediation Program for the Southern District of New York became
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mortgage mediation programs utilized by the same courts during the foreclosure
crisis which have had great success in reducing litigation. 272 The judiciary's goals in
creating such a program are to "facilitate communication and the exchange of
information in an efficient and transparent manner, and to encourage the parties to
consensually reach a feasible and jointly beneficial agreement under the
administrative oversight" of the bankruptcy court. 273
Both programs apply to government and private student loans no matter what
type of institution the student attended. Though neither program requires a lender
to add or modify existing repayment options, good faith participation is required. 274
Each program also requires an open and transparent exchange of information with
set time frames including a time and process for requesting to participate in the
program. 275 The Southern District of New York requires that the debtor first apply
for a student loan repayment option directly with the creditor, and only if there is
no response within forty-five days of mailing the application or if the response
received was inconsistent with the results provided by the application can the debtor
be eligible for the program.276
Neither program has been in operation long enough to produce data on their
efficacy, but their adoption shows judicial support for mediation and the usefulness
of the foreclosure mediation analogy.
C. Private Student Loans Mediation Act Features
1. Loans Subject to the Act

Much like the PSBPA, the goal of PSLMA is to apply to all private loans that
are provided by for-profit higher education institutions. But the Act would also

effective in January 27, 2020. See Adoption of Student Loan Mediation Before Litigation Program
Procedures (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2020) (General Order M-536).
272. See Tammy Branson & Christie D. Arkovich, Student Loan Management Program in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida, 88 BRIEFS 8 (Jan. 7, 2020),
https:/ /www.orangecountybar.org/news/student-loan-management-program-in-the-united-statesbankruptcy-court-for-the-middle-dis trict-of-florida/
[h ttps: / / perma.cc /NLN 3-ZV6V].
Tammy
Branson and Christine Arkovich are members of the Student Loan Committee for the U.S. Middle
District of Florida. Id.
273. Third Amended Administrative Order Prescribing Procedures for Student Loan
Management Program, supra note 271, ,r 1.
274. Id. ,r 7(a) (defining good faith as "The Required Parties shall act in good faith throughout
the SLM Period. Good faith includes, but is not limited to, promptly responding to all inquiries through
the Portal and providing all requested documentation and information."); Adoption of Student Loan
Mediation Before Litigation Program Procedures, supra note 271, ,r VII (defining good faith, which is
required when SLM parties negotiate, as "includ[ing] a duty by the Creditor to accept a Debtor's
postpetition Student Loan payments as provided by the SLM Program and Local Rule 9019-3. A Party
that fails to participate in SLM in good faith may be subject to sanctions.").
275. Third Amended Administrative Order Prescribing Procedures for Student Loan
Management Program, supra note 271, ,r,r 1, 5, 9-11; Adoption of Student Loan Mediation Before
Litigation Program Procedures, supra note 271, ,r,r I, III.
276. Adoption of Student Loan Mediation Before Litigation Program Procedures, supra note
271, ,r III(B).
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apply to nonprofit higher education institutions that contract out all of their services
to for-profit entities in order to address the concerns discussed above. Each
component of these definitions is further discussed below.
The PLMSA expressly excludes government loans made, insured, or
guaranteed under the Higher Education Act277 and defines private student loans as
[a loan that] is issued expressly for postsecondary educational expenses to
a borrower, regardless of whether the loan is provided through the
educational institution that the subject student attends or directly to the
borrower from the private educational lender. 278
The PSLMA defines for-profit educational institution by first incorporating the
definition for higher education as found in the HERA. 279 The PSLMA then goes a
step further to also encompass "private nonprofit institution[s] of higher
education" to address the problem of a nonprofit substantially operated or
controlled by a for-profit institution.
The PSLMA borrows the definition of "private nonprofit institution of higher
education" as defined by recently amended Maryland Code of Education section
10-101(k). 280 The statute previously defined a "private nonprofit institution of
higher education" as a higher education that generally limits enrollment to graduates
of secondary schools and awards degrees at the associate, baccalaureate, or graduate
level and included an independent institution of higher education within the
definition. 281 House Bill 461 alters the definition of "private nonprofit institution
of higher education" to mean, in addition to current criteria, that the institution "(i)
benefits no person through any part of its net earnings; (ii) [i]s legally authorized to
operate as a nonprofit organization in each state in which it is physically located;
[and] (iii) [i]s determined by the Internal Revenue Service to be an organization to
which contributions are tax-deductible .... " 282 The bill also explicitly states that
"'[p ]rivate nonprofit institution of higher education' does not include an institution
engaging in a reportable incident unless the Commission has determined that the
incident does not constitute private inurement." 283 The bill goes on to define what
a reportable incident is and requires the Maryland Higher Education Commission
(MHEC) to determine whether an incident constitutes private inurement. 284 Under

277. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070a, 1070b, 1070d-33, 1070g-1, 1070h, 1071, 1087-53,
1087a, 1087aa.
278. See infra Appendix B.
279. 20 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1)-(3), (b).
280. Mo. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 10-101(k) (West 2019).
281. 2019 Mo. LAWS 3040.
282. EDUC.§ 10-101(k:)(1)(i)-(iii).
283. Id.§ 10-101(k:)(3).
284. Id. § 10-101(0) ("'Reportable Incident' means any of the following as reportable on a
private nonprofit institution of higher education's Form 990 of the Internal Revenue Service: (1) The
engagement in an excess benefit transaction with a disqualified person; (2) The providing of a grant or
other assistance by the institution to a member of the governing body; (3) The reporting of receivables
from or payables to a member of the governing body; (4) The institution was a party to a business
transaction connected to a member of the institution's governing body; (5) The institution was a party
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the Commission's regulations, institutions are allowed to engage in corrective action
to have their classification returned to nonprofit status. 285
The bill was brought about in response to the Higher Leaming Commission,
an accreditor, changing their guidelines to allow for an arrangement in which an
institution set up as a nonprofit may outsource a range of services to a separate
for-profit company. 286 Though, as argued above, the problem of covert nonprofits
by for-profit institutions is an IRS enforcement issue, states feel obliged to monitor
covert nonprofit institutions and take certain action to protect students, such as
requiring an institution to provide financial guarantees. 287 Because an institution's
status as a nonprofit can evolve throughout its tenure, the PSBPA did not include
this more expansive definition. However, the PSLMA is applicable on defaulted
private student loans before legal proceedings are initiated when students may be
most in need of guarantee funds or other state protections established to benefit
for-profit school attendees.

2. Amount in Default
The PSLMA as proposed in Appendix B is applicable to all private student
loans from for-profit institutions no matter the amount of default. This is, in large
part, because of the variability in small claims court civil jurisdiction thresholds
across the nation. 288 Some courts set their threshold as low as $3,500 to as high as
$25,000. 289 Other states, such as California, have an even more complicated small
claims threshold with exceptions. 290 The thresholds of small claims courts are likely
to influence the scope and application of PSLMA of a particular jurisdiction.
Another factor to consider is the debt loads of those that are currently
struggling to make their payments. According to the Federal Reserve Board, of
those borrowers behind on their payments eighteen percent of borrowers owe less
than $10,000 of outstanding debt, twenty-two percent owe between $10,000 and

to a prohibited tax shelter transaction; (6) The institution participated in an equity-based compensation
arrangement; or (7) The institution paid compensation contingent on the revenue of the institution or
any related organization.").
285. Mo. CODE REGS. 13B.01.03.07 (2020).
286. H.B. 461, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2019), http:/ /mgaleg.maryland.gov/
2019RS/ fnotes/bil_0001/hb0461.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/FDE8-8VFM]; see also Mills, supra note 217;
Shireman, supra note 217, at tbl.1.
287. Memorandum from Emily A.A. Dow, Ph.D., Assistant Sec'y, Academic Affairs, to
Md. Higher Educ. Comm., Final Approval of New COMAR Regulations - Private Inurement by
Nonprofit
Institutions of Higher Education 13, 15 (Jan. 22, 2020), https:/ /mhec.maryland.gov/
About/ SiteAs sets /Lis ts/ Meeting%20Agendas %20and %20Agenda%20Books /EditForm/ CommBoo
kl-22-20.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/N5AX-W82E].
288. WILLIAM
E.
RAFTERY,
CIVIL
JURISDICTION
THRESHOLDS
(2015),
https:/ /www.ncsc.org/ _data/ assets/ pdf_file/ 0014/ 16160 / civil-jurisdiction-thresholds-history.pdf
[https:/ /perma.cc/UR9U-6AXP].
289. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-503A (2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-15-501(d)(1)
(West 2009).
290. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§§ 116.210-116.270 (West 2003).
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$24,999 of debt, and sixteen percent owe more than $100,000. 291 Though these
numbers are not particular to private student loan debts, they offer some insight on
the impact on the program size when setting a default threshold amount.

3. Required Communication and Disclosure
The PSLMA seeks to bridge this disparity between federal and private student
loans by providing private student loan borrowers an opportunity to fully discuss
their repayment plan or loss mitigation options in a facilitated mediation. Facilitated
mediation, however, would expedite communication between a struggling private
student loan borrower and their lender by first requiring the lender to send a notice
of default and right to cure thirty days prior to initiating any legal proceeding. The
notice will provide essential information to the borrower including the nature of
default and the specific action required to cure, and provide the borrower an
opportunity to dispute the default and raise any other defenses. In addition, the
PSLMA would require an exchange of information prior to the mediation
session itself.
The PSLMA would require lenders to disclose to borrowers the loss mitigation
options available to them. By doing so, the Act lifts the veil of confusion and
steering of borrowers into more costly options.
Mediation will also help lenders address the proportionally higher student
default rates for private loans from for-profit institutions. 292 The PSLMA requires
servicers to fully assess and communicate with student borrowers. With mediation
acting as a last resort, borrowers will be less likely to default as the borrower works
together with the lender to revise their repayments and avoid default.

4. Mediation Costs
The PSLMA may increase operating costs to lenders and impose minor delays
before pursuing a default against private borrowers. However, the model act sets
the cost of facilitated mediation at the current market rate for mediation with both
parties paying half the cost unless there is a determination by a facilitator that justice
requires an alternative payment.
The cost will be further mitigated by fewer defaulting borrowers and a higher
standard of repayment plans. The private student loan lenders admit that offering
post-default rehabilitative programs could help banks recover some of the

291. Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2018-May 2019,
Bo. GOVERNORS FED. RsRV. SYS., https:/ /www.federalreserve.gov/pubhcations/2019-economicwell-being-of-us-households-in-2018-student-loans-and-other-education-debt.htm [https:/ /perma.cc/
W2JN-J7CH] Qan. 30, 2020).
292. According to the Federal Reserve Board, more than one-fifth of borrowers who attended
private for-profit institutions are behind on student loan payments, versus eight percent who attended
public institutions and five percent who attended private not-for-profit institutions. Id.
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nonperforming debt and could be marketed to borrowers as a benefit offered by
the bank. 293
It can also help loan servicers improve their overall service performance which
could ultimately avoid them having to pay millions in penalties. 294 This assertion is
supported by the research evaluating foreclosure mediation programs, which
evaluated five years of foreclosure data and strongly suggested that the marginal
delay for well-run mediation programs imposes modest costs, particularly compared
to the benefits of successful mediation. 295 Regrettably, there is no true cost-benefit
analysis because of the variability of mediation programs and student loan servicer
loss mitigation options. But much could have been said of foreclosure mediation
programs, yet all subsequent analysis supports the cost effectiveness of mediation.
5. Good Faith Requirement

Every contract governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) has an
obligation of good faith and fair dealing (section 1-304). Private lenders must show
good faith and fair dealing to avoid misleading or defrauding borrowers, similar to
common commercial standards. At or before the mediation, lenders must make
diligent efforts to inform the borrower of foreseeable duties and consequences for
each available option offered by the private student loan lender. Inclusion of a good
faith requirement within the Private Student Mediation Act is an essential
component to achieve the prodding function that will require student loan services
to fully evaluate borrowers for options when there is no other incentive for them
to do so.
However, the Uniform Mediation Act emphasizes the confidentiality of
mediators, which may limit their ability to report on the level of engagement of the
parties in the process. 296 Even though most foreclosure programs keep the financial
and policy records confidential, the concern is that requiring mediators to report on
how forthcoming the parties were within mediation will hamper the parties'
willingness to participate and jeopardize the mediator's neutrality.
But an evaluation of the good faith requirement as applied in foreclosure
mediation instead emphasizes the need for clear requirements and expectations
within the rules to ensure enforceability and accountability.
''New York and Nevada are the two states with the most reported cases
applying a broad duty to negotiate in good faith ... in [which] virtually all cases" tie

293. GA0-19-430, supra note 16, at 12.
294. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0013 ,r,r 73, 79 (Aug. 22, 2016), in
which Wells Fargo was required to pay $3.6 Million penalty to the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau and $410,000 in consumer refunds.
295. White, supra note 253, at 11.
296. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 8 (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2003)
("Unless subject to the [insert statutory references to open meetings act and open records act],
mediation communications are confidential to the extent agreed by the parties or provided by other
law or rule of this State.").
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servicer misconduct "either to violations of specific program requirements ... or
to some type of misrepresentation." 297 In fact, New York amended the Mandatory
Settlement Conference Act in 2009 to expressly require good faith negotiation. 298
This legislation was passed in part because "[a]s the mortgage cns1s
... worsened ... it. .. bec[a]me evident that more must be accomplished to protect
New Yorkers in these difficult times and beyond." 299 Once the law was passed a
lower New York state court stated it had an "affirmative obligation to ensure that
the primary statutory goal of keeping homeowners in their homes, and the
concomitant obligation of ensuring that the parties act in good faith, are met." 300
Given that the complaints surrounding private student loan servicing echo the same
concerns raised by homeowners during the foreclosure crisis, one could argue
mediation could be equally effective in ensuring borrowers are fully evaluated for
all their options.
Common problems in foreclosure mediation programs echo the concerns of
student loan borrowers in dealing with their servicers, such as not appearing "with
an authorized representative who could make decisions on loss mitigation
questions," unduly delaying application decisions, or failing "to give reasonable
explanations for their decisions," 301 all of which resulted in sanctions against the
servicers for failing to mediate in good faith.
Such findings have been imposed whether or not there has been an underlying
modification program in which mortgage servicers must offer. The Suffolk County
Supreme Court sanctioned a subprime lender that appeared at a settlement
conference with "no good faith intention whatsoever of resolving [the] matter in
any manner other than a complete and forcible devolution of title .... " 302 We!Lr
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hughes illustrates the court's frustration and ability to hold
servicers accountable when they fail to adhere to the pw.pose of the mediation
enabling statutes:
The terms of the proposed Modification Agreement, particularly but not
exclusively the inclusion of an adjustable rate component, are unacceptable

297. White, supra note 253, at 24. Violations of program requirements include "timely
participation, timely action on, and accurate communication regarding homeowner loss mitigation
applications." Id.
298. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408(1) (McKinney 2017).
299. Wells Fargo Bank v. Hughes, 897 N.Y.S.2d 605, 608 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (quoting S. ASSEMB.
B. 236-507, 7th Ses s., at 9 (N .Y. 2009), http:// digitalcollections .archives .n ysed.gov / index. php / Detail/
objects/22742 [https:/ /perma.cc/RXZ8-2AFN]).
300. Bank of Am. v. Rausher, 981 N.Y.S.2d 269,272 (Sup. Ct. 2014) (citations omitted).
301. GEOFF WALSH, NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR., REBUILDING AMERICA: How STATES CAN
SAVE MILLIONS OF HOMES THROUGH FORECLOSURE MEDIATION 7 (2012) ("Sanctions have
included monetary penalties, orders for servicers to bring in a qualified representative to negotiate,
orders tolling accrual of interest and fees during periods of delay, and orders to modify a loan."). Some
courts have gone as far as prohibiting a foreclosure sale or dismissing a judicial foreclosure case with
prejudice, thus preventing the servicer from re-filing the claim. Id.
302. IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Yano-Horoski, 890 N.Y.S.2d 313, 315 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (applying
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 130-1.1 (1998)).
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to this Court. The proposed Modification Agreement flies in the face of
the ... legislation ... which was designed to assist borrowers in
foreclosure cases to remain in their homes and to prevent a foreclosure
crisis like the one currently gripping this state and the nation from
reoccurring in the future. 303
The court went on to find ''Wells Fargo has acted in bad faith and contrary to
CPLR § 3408 by presenting Hughes with the Modification Agreement [with an
adjustable rate and unaffordable payment] ... and, notwithstanding, the Court's
directive, obstinately refusing to revise its terms in accordance with the stated
intention of the Legislature."304
However the courts are limited in the sanction they can impose as they cannot
change the settlement parameters of the parties or require particular contract
terms. 305 In fact, "a determination not to modify a mortgage loan by a foreclosing
bank that is under no legal obligation to modify such a loan ... does not constitute
bad faith." 306
Though the PSLMA may shed light on the inconsistent and unfair practices
of the private student loan servicers and even raise the status quo of industry
practice, it is just one of the tools to help the most vulnerable student borrowers
that have otherwise been ignored by regulators.

D. Constitutional Validity of the PSIMA
Though this proposal would have a retroactive effect upon all private student
loan contracts in collection, mandatory mediation before collecting a student loan
default does not impair the obligation of contracts. 307 Though a retroactive law that
deprives a person of a vested property right may constitute a taking, 308 "[t]he
threshold inquiry is 'whether state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial
impairment of a contractual relationship."' 309
The next step, as specified by the Supreme Court, is to apply a level of scrutiny
proportional to the magnitude of the contractual burden identified in the first step.
"If the state regulation constitutes a substantial impairment, the State, in
justification, must have a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the
regulation," and then after "a legitimate public pw.pose has been identified, the next
inquiry is whether the adjustment ... '[is based] upon reasonable conditions and [is]
of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying [the legislation's

303.
304.
305.
required to

897 N.Y.S.2d. at 609.
Id.
Negron v. Woodhull Hosp., 173 F. App'x. 77, 79 n.1 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[A] party is not
change its settlement parameters by reason of a court order to attend a settlement

conference.'').

306. See JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Ilardo, 940 N.Y.S.2d 829, 843-44 (Sup. Ct. 2012).
307. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
308. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
309. Energy Rsrvs. Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411 (1983) (quoting
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234,244 (1978)).
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adoption]."' 310 In Home Building & LoanAss'n v. Blaisdell, the Supreme Court found
that since "the contract clause is not an absolute and utterly unqualified restriction
of the States' protective power," the state was justified in passing legislation to
protect the vital and basic interests of the community especially when the legislation
was connected to the interests of all parties affected. 311
"[S]tate regulation that restricts a party to gains it reasonably expected from
the contract does not necessarily constitute a substantial impairment." 312 One factor
in determining the extent of the impairment is whether or not the industry "has
been regulated in the past." 313 Since 1965, with the enactment of Higher Education
Act, the student loan market has been regulated. While this Act primarily served to
provide protections for federal student aid, it also puts restrictions on funding for
for-profit private student loans and increases the pressure on these schools from
attaining funds from nonfederal sources. But this is just one act in a heavily
regulated industry as evidenced by the HEA Reauthorization Act (1972), Student
Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act (2010), and Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA).
Federal courts have permitted retroactive application of civil legislation
without finding a violation of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. 314 Therefore,
as currently applied by the federal courts, the Supreme Court's Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause jurisprudence "opens a door for constraints on retroactivity but will
only apply in relatively extreme cases." 315 A taking of a contract can occur when the
government itself seizes the rights of the parties under the contract. 316 The test, as
articulated by the Supreme Court in Omnia Commercial Co., is whether the
government has "appropriated" the parties' contractual rights or merely
"frustrated" them. 317 These cases deal with the "taking" of a contract right after it
has been created, and not with the "taking'' of the right to contract freely. A state

310. Id. at 411-12. (alteration in original).
311. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447 (1934). In this case, the Act
allowed for an extension of the redemption period for foreclosure sales. Id. at 416.
312. Energy Rsrvs. Grp., Inc., 459 U.S. at 411 (citing U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431
U.S. 1, 31 (1977); El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 515 (1965)).
313. Id. (citing Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 242 n.13; Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940)).
314. See Quarty v. United States, 170 F.3d 961, 968-70 (9th Cir. 1999); Willoughby
Dev. Corp. v. Ravalli Cnty., 338 F. App'x 581, 583 (9th Cir. 2009); In re Thompson, 867 F.2d 416,422
(7th Cir. 1989); Am. Express Travel Related Servs., Inc. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 370-72 (3d
Cir. 2012).
315. WILLIAM]. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 677 (3d ed. 2011).
316. When the government, for war purposes, requisitioned the entire production of a steel
manufacturer, rendering impossible and unlawful performance of an outstanding contract between the
manufacturer and a customer, the customer's rights were not taken by the government, but frustrated
by its lawful action. Omnia Com. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 513 (1923); cf Lynch v. United
States, 292 U.S. 571,579 (1934) ("The Fifth Amendment commands that property be not taken without
making just compensation. Valid contracts are property, whether the obligor be a private individual,
municipality, a state, or the United States.").
317. Omnia Com. Co., 261 U.S. at 511-12.
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shall not pass a law revoking, invalidating, or altering a contract, but a court may
order mediation or other alternative dispute resolution as a process step to invoking
the judicial system for powers of collection. Similar to court-ordered pretrial
alternative dispute resolution, mediation of private student loan debt collections
allows an impartial third party to facilitate communication and ensure good faith
requirements have been met.
CONCLUSION

Private student loan borrowers do not have the right typically afforded to
debtors with unsecured loans to discharge debt in bankruptcy, nor do they have the
multitude of repayment and discharge rights afforded to federal student loan
borrowers. For-profit higher education students have for decades been subject to
abusive and deceptive practices. The intersection of these groups-for-profit
school students with private education debt-consists of a group in substantial need
of new consumer protections.
This Article has set forth two model laws that states may enact to bring
protections to these forgotten borrowers. First, new private student loans entered
into by for-profit school borrowers could include many of the protections given to
federal student loan borrowers through the use of mandated contract terms under
state law. Second, private student loans to for-profit school students that end in
default should be enforceable only if the lender engages in mediation in an effort to
reach a loan modification or other settlement of the outstanding debt. We rely on
successful federal and state consumer protections-the FTC Holder Rule and state
foreclosure mediation laws-as support for the workability of the concepts
underlying these proposals.
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APPENDIX A: MODEL ACT #1
PRIVATE STUDENT BORROWER PROTECTION ACT
Section 1. Citation. Sections _to_ shall be cited as the [state] Private Student
Borrower Protection Act.
Section 2. Scope and Application. The following words and terms where
used in the [state] Private Student Borrower Protection Act shall have the meanings
ascribed to them in this section.
"Covered loan" means a private student loan to a covered student.
"Covered student" means a student attending a proprietary institutioni. and the proprietary institution has a physical presence in this state; or
ii. the student is a resident of this state, as defined under [insert]3 18, and the
proprietary institution provides the course of study for the student through
distance education.
''Distance education" means [insert].319
"Federal student loan" means a student loan made by the United States
government or any agency of the United States government.
''Lender" means a person who makes a covered loan.
"Physical presence" [insert].3 20
"Private student loan" means a loan that is a qualified education loan, as
defined in section 221(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, incurred by a
debtor who is an individual, unless that educational loan is made, insured, or
guaranteed by a governmental unit, including a federal student loan, or is made
under any program funded in whole or in part by a government unit or a nonprofit
institution substantially affiliated with a government unit. 321
"Proprietary institution" means a higher educational institution in any
State thati. meets the definition of a "proprietary institution of higher education" in 20
U.S.C. § 1002(b); or

318. A state should adopt an appropriate definition of residency by reference to existing
state law.
319. Most states have existing law defining "distance education," "physical presence," or
analogous concepts. See, e,g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-13-325 (West 2009). The National Council for
State Authorization Reciprocity Agreements offers model definitions for these terms. NAT'L COUNCIL
FOR STATE AUTHORIZATION RECIPROCITY AGREEMENTS, supra note 229, § 1, at 11 ("'Distance
Education' means: instruction offered by any means where the student and faculty member are in
separate physical locations. It includes, but is not limited to, online, interactive video and
correspondence courses or programs."). Physical presence is discussed at length in the SARA Manual.
Id.§ 5.10, at 40-41.
320. See supra note 319.
321. This language is adapted from the bankruptcy discharge exception provision. See 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).

2020]

FORGOTTEN BORROWERS

97

ii. is a nonprofit institution substantially operated or controlled by a for-profit
institution and would meet the definition of a "proprietary institution of higher
education" in 20 U.S.C. § 1002(b) except for being a nonprofit institution.
Section 3. Required Rights in Loan Contract. In connection with the
origination of any covered loan, the lender shall include in the loan contract the
following provisions:
"For pw.poses of these contract provisions required under the [state] Private
Student Borrower Protection Act, 'federal student loan' means student loan made
by the United States government.
"Eligibility for Federal Student Loan Discharge. Notwithstanding any other
provision of this contract to the contrary, any holder of this loan contract shall
accept as full payment and satisfaction of all obligations of the borrower any of
the following:
"(1) Either: (a) proof that the borrower has obtained a discharge of a federal
student loan for reason of death or disability; or (b) proof equivalent to that required
for a borrower to discharge a federal student loan for reason of death or disability
under 20 U.S.C. § 1087(a) or regulations adopted thereunder.
"(2) Either: (a) proof that the borrower has obtained a discharge of a federal
student loan for reason of the closure of the school attended or false certification
of eligibility for a federal loan; or (b) proof equivalent to that required for a borrower
to discharge a federal student loan for reason of school closure under 20
U.S.C. § 1087(c) or regulations adopted thereunder.
"Alternative Income-Based Repayment. Notwithstanding any other provision
of this contract to the contrary, the borrower shall not be in default if the borrower
makes periodic payments on this loan equal to the share available to the holder of this
contract of the private student loan repayment limit. For pw.poses of this provision, the
private student loan repayment limit shall be equal to thirty percent of the periodic
amount owed by the borrower on an income-based repayment program under
which the borrower is obligated to repay all of the borrower's federal student loans,
except that this amount shall be calculated as the amount that would have been due
to be repaid on the federal student loans through income-based repayment without
regard to any prepayment of the federal student loans. For pw.poses of this
provision, the share available to the holder of this contract shall be the private student loan
repayment limit minus any periodic payments due by the borrower for this alternative
income-based repayment for any private student loan originated at a date prior to
the date of origination of this loan. If the borrower did not obtain federal student
loans to the attend the school for which proceeds of this loan were used to attend,
the borrower shall not be in default if the borrower makes periodic payments on
this loan equal to thirty percent of the periodic payments that would have been due
for a federal student loan of the same amount under the Pay as You Earn program
described in 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)."
Section 4. Format of Required Provisions. The contract provisions
required by Section 3 shall be in at least 12-point type with italics and underline as
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provided in Section 3. The contract provisions required by Section 3 shall be on a
separate page from all other contract language except the provisions required, if any,
under the Federal Trade Commission Preservation of Consumers' Claims and
Defenses rule, 16 C.F.R. Part 433. The separate page with the required contract
provisions shall include the following heading in 14-point, boldface type: ''Your
Right to Alternative Loan Repayment and Discharge Under the [State
Name] Private Student Borrower Protection Act."
Section 5. Deception or Overshadowing. No covered lender, proprietary
institution, or other person shall, in connection with a covered loan, engage in
statements or conduct that deceive or mislead persons provided or offered a
covered loan about the rights provided under the Private Student Borrower
Protection Act.
Section 6. Enforcement. Failure to include in a covered loan the contract
provisions required by Section 3, breach of any of the contract provisions required
by Section 3, or any other violation of the Private Student Borrower Protection Act
shall constitute a violation of [state UDAP law]. 322

322. Insert a reference to the appropriate state UDAP law and any corresponding public or
private enforcement provisions, as appropriate.
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APPENDIXB: MODEL ACT #2
PRIVATE STUDENT LOAN MEDIATION ACT
Section 1. Citation. Sections_ to_ shall be cited as the [state] Private Student
Loan Mediation Act.
Section 2. Scope and Application. The following words and terms where
used in sections _ to _ shall have the meanings ascribed to them in this Section.
This legislation applies to Private Education Loans that are provided by For-Profit
Higher Education Institutions and Nonprofit Higher Education Institutions that
contract out all of their services to for-profit entities. The term "for-profit higher
education institution" means an educational institution in any state thati. falls under the definition of higher education as found in 20
u.s.c. § 1002(b);323
ii. institution engaging in a reportable incident unless the [state commission]
has determined that the incident does not constitute private inurement.
Section 3. Definitions.
1. Facilitated Mediation. A conference at which the parties in dispute over
the collection of a private educational loan debt, their attorneys, additional
representatives of the parties, or a combination of those persons appear before a
facilitator to discuss the positions of the parties in an attempt to reach agreement
on a loss mitigation program for the student borrower and lender.
2. Loss Mitigation Program. An alternative payment structure offered in
connection with an attempt to repay a private educational loan that:
Protects the Borrower from the adverse effects of default on private education
loans, including, but not limited to:
Negative credit reporting;
Accelerated payments; and
Collection actions;
Accounts for the borrower's ability to reasonably repay the private educational
loan, considering
Adjusted gross income;
Local cost of living; and
Other factors contributing to financial hardship.
3. Private Educational Lender (Lender). Any person, its agents,
subsidiaries, or affiliates engaged in the business of soliciting, making, servicing,
collecting, or extending private education loans.
4. Private Education Loans. A loan provided by a private educational
lender that(i) is not made, insured, or guaranteed under of title IV of the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1070 et seq.);

323.

Language taken from the Higher Education Act. 20 U.S.C. § 1002(b).
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(ii) is issued expressly for postsecondary educational expenses to a borrower,
regardless of whether the loan is provided through the educational institution that
the subject student attends or directly to the borrower from the private
educational lender;

5. Facilitator. A natural person who is trained to mediate disputes but may
inform and discuss with both parties the rights of each party.
6. Default. The nonpayment of a debt obligation within the contractually
obligated period, but before any negative action has been taken on the Borrower.
7. Borrower. A natural person who has agreed to take out the Private
Education Loan and is obligated to make repayment on the Private Education Loan.
8. Good Faith. Means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing.
Section 4. Prohibited Acts, Notice of Default, Right to Cure.
a. No Lender may initiate any legal proceeding based upon the collection of a
debt against Borrower until thirty days after Lender sends separately to Borrower a
written notice of default and right to cure.
b. The notice under this section must statei. the nature of the default, including a statement, as of the date of the notice,
of all past-due payments, fees, and other charges owed to the Lender;
ii. the specific action the Borrower must take to cure any curable default,
including the exact amount that must be paid, all payment methods permitted by
Section_, and any other payment method acceptable to the Lender;
iii. the date by which the default must be cured, which may not be fewer than
thirty days after the date the notice is sent;
iv. the effect of curing the default, including the right to have the obligation
remain in effect;
v. that Borrower may dispute the default and raise any other defense or
payment of the obligation or the manner of exercising those rights;
vi. the name of:
(1) Lender and the facts that establish Lender's right to collect under
Section_;
(2) the legal owner of the obligation, if Lender is not the legal owner;
(3) that Borrower may request a copy of the negotiable instrument or other
evidence of the obligation and a copy of any record that demonstrates the right to
foreclose; and
(4) if Borrower is relying on a lost, destroyed, or stolen negotiable
instrument, the information required by Section _.
c. The notice under this Section may contain additional information, including
a statement that additional amounts will come due after the date of the notice.
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Section 5. Notice of Mediation.
Before commencing any legal proceeding against Borrower, Private
Educational Lender shalli. request under Subsection (2) that the Facilitator send the Borrower notice
of the right to participate in Facilitated Mediation; or
ii. send the notice under Subsection (3).
If the Facilitator establishes a procedure for sending the notice required by
Subsection (a) or (b), the Lender shall request the Facilitator to send the notice to
the Borrower and the Facilitator shall promptly send the notice.
If the Facilitator does not establish a procedure for sending notice required by
Subsection (a) or (b), the Lender shall send notice to Borroweri. by first-class certified mail addressed to Borrower at the Borrower's last
known address; and
ii. by electronic mail to Borrower's electronic mail address.
A notice under this section of the right to participate in Facilitated Mediation
must include the following:
i. the name, address, telephone number, and electronic-mail address of
the Lender;
ii. a statement that the Borrower may request Facilitated Mediation and that
the request must be made not later than thirty days after notice is sent;
iii. the instructions for requesting Facilitated Mediation and all eligibility
requirements under the Facilitator's rules;
iv. a description of all documents that the Facilitator's rules require the
Borrower to bring to the Facilitated Meditation; and
v. a form prescribed by the Facilitator for the Borrower to request Facilitated
Mediation and to affirm that the Borrower meets the eligibility requirements of
Section_.
Section 6. Process for Facilitated Mediation.
Borrower has thirty days to agree to the notice of mediation as proscribed in
Section .
If Borrower accepts the opportunity to participate in facilitated meditation,
the Private Educational Lender must notify Borrower and communicate with
Borrower to determine a reasonable time within thirty days to schedule the
facilitated mediation.
Parties must schedule Facilitated Mediation for a period no sooner than thirty
days after the agreed schedule date.
Parties have until one week prior to the scheduled Facilitated Mediation to
provide the opposing party with copies of all documents that will be used at
Facilitated Mediation to showi. ownership of the loan;
11.
description and eligibility criteria for any private loan loss
mitigation options;
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iii. current income of Borrower;
iv. current assets of Borrower; and
v. other documents necessary in order to resolve the dispute and determine an
appropriate loss mitigation program.
All parties involved in the mediation outside of the Facilitator must have
authority to settle the dispute for their respective side.
If Borrower rejects the opportunity to participate in Facilitated Mediations,
the Borrower must notify Private Educational Lender in writing; and
Private Educational Lender must retain the rejection notification for its
records for a period of [insert legal record keeping statute reference].
If Private Educational Lender is unable to obtain a rejection notification,
[rebuttable presumption that lender did not attempt to offer facilitated mediation in
good faith].
If Borrower and Private Educational Lender cannot reach an agreed mediation
date within the period noted in Part 2 and failure was due toPrivate Educational Lender
Then Private Educational Lender may not attempt to collect on the debt.
Borrower
Then Private Educational Lender has a presumption of a good faith attempt
at mediation.
Section 7. Resolution of Facilitated Mediation. If parties reach an
agreement in Good Faith Facilitated Mediation, Private Educational Lender must
file the agreement with the court clerk.
Section 8. Funding.
The cost of Facilitated Mediation will be based upon the current market rate
for mediation services.
Borrower and Private Educational Lender must each pay half of the cost of
Facilitated Mediation unless the Facilitator determines justice requires an
alternative payment.
Section 9. Good Faith and Fair Dealing.
A Private Educational Lender whose conduct is governed by this Act shall
comply in good faith and fair dealing with the requirements throughout the entire
lending process, including, but not limited to negotiating process, lending process,
and debt collection process.
The duty of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every lending contract,
even though sometimes not mentioned in the contract.
A Private Educational Lender shall be honest in fact and proceed in a
commercially reasonable manner of fair dealing in complying with this Act. Factors
determining "fair dealing" includes, but not limited toi. parties having the authority to settle the dispute at the facilitated mediation;
ii. parties making reasonable effort to communicate with each other and settle
the dispute;
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iii. litigation is only allowed after parties' efforts to negotiate fail and the
settlement agreement seems reasonably futile; and
iv. Private Educational Lender shall not exercise any undue influence
throughout the entire lending process.
If a Private Educational Lender proves to follow business norms in a
reasonable manner by a preponderance of evidence, a breach of good faith and fair
dealing requirement cannot be found.
Unless otherwise stipulated, a breach of good faith and fair dealing cannot be
an independent cause of action; but a breach of covenant of implied good faith and
fair dealing can be a cause of action.
Unless otherwise stipulated, the duty of good faith and fair dealing shall
continue until the lending contract is fully performed.

Section 10. Civil Action, Remedies.
Cause of Action. If a Private Educational Lender violates any provision of
sections_ to _, Borrower may bring an injunction action to prevent collection of
the Private Educational Loan and may be awarded attorney's fees and costs.
Damages. If a court finds repeated attempts to collect on a Private
Educational Loan that does not satisfy the requirements of sections _ to _, during
the cure period, while Facilitated Mediation is pending, or after being enjoined, the
violating party will be liable fori. actual damages;
ii. statutory damages of [insert viable amount];
iii. attorney's fees;
iv. costs and disbursements; and
v. any other equitable relief as determined by the court.
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